GR L L 33502; (July 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-33502. July 25, 1975.
FEDERICO CABREJAS, NARDO SORIANO, WESCESLAO MONTENEGRO, ANGELES CABREJAS, and JOSE GUINCAO, petitioners, vs. HON. LUIS P. DONGALLO, as Judge of Municipal Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and EULALIO D. ROSETE, as Provincial Fiscal of Bukidnon, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners were accused of arson under Article 322(4) of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 1877 before the Municipal Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, presided by respondent Judge Luis P. Dongallo. They filed a motion praying that the case be tried on the merits by the municipal court, arguing that the offense, punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 6 years), fell within the court’s jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 3828 , which grants capital town municipal courts jurisdiction over crimes with penalties not exceeding prision correccional.
Respondent Judge denied the motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration, sustaining the Provincial Fiscal’s contention that since the crime was within the concurrent jurisdiction of both the municipal court and the Court of First Instance (CFI), and the criminal complaint included the phrase “within the preliminary jurisdiction,” the municipal court could only conduct a preliminary investigation. Petitioners then filed this certiorari and mandamus proceeding to compel the municipal court to try the case on the merits.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the municipal court to try the arson case on the merits has been rendered moot and academic.
RULING
Yes, the petition is moot and academic. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on this ground. The legal logic is straightforward: during the pendency of the petition before the Court, the factual circumstances underlying the controversy were fundamentally altered. As revealed in the petitioners’ own Motion to Dismiss, respondent Judge Dongallo reversed his earlier stand and decided to try the arson case on the merits. He required the Provincial Fiscal to present evidence, but the Fiscal refused. Consequently, respondent Judge issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 1877. A copy of this dismissal order was subsequently submitted to the Court in compliance with its resolution.
The core relief sought by the petitioners—a judicial order compelling the municipal court to conduct a trial on the merits—was thereby overtaken by events. The subject criminal case no longer existed, having been dismissed by the very court whose action was being assailed. When the principal case sought to be affected by a petition has been terminated, any ruling on the purported errors in its prior proceedings would be ineffectual and advisory. The Court consistently refrains from deciding cases that no longer present a live, justiciable controversy. Since there was no active case left to remand or to try, the petition lost its practical purpose and was rendered moot. The dismissal on this procedural ground made it unnecessary for the Court to resolve the substantive jurisdictional question regarding concurrent jurisdiction between municipal courts and courts of first instance.
