G.R. No. L-9265; April 29, 1957
LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. LUZON MARINE DEPARTMENT UNION and THE HON. MODESTO CASTILLO, THE HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, THE HON. V. JIMENEZ YANSON and THE HON. JUAN L. LANTING, Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, respondents.

FACTS

On June 21, 1948, respondent Luzon Marine Department Union filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) containing several demands against petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. While the case was pending, the union declared a strike on July 18, 1948, which was later declared illegal by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the union filed a “Constancia” with the CIR praying for the resolution of its remaining unresolved demands from the original petition, which included: (a) overtime pay for work beyond eight hours and double pay for work on Sundays and holidays; (b) payment of back wages for December 1941; (c) reinstatement with back pay for three specific employees allegedly suspended for union activities; and (d) reinstatement with back pay for all officers and crew of four named tugboats allegedly discharged for union activities.
After hearings and submission of evidence, the trial judge of the CIR rendered a decision on February 10, 1955. The court found that the employees worked from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. daily, including Sundays and holidays, and were given free meals and rest periods. The petitioner was found to have paid overtime for work beyond eight hours. The court ruled that the petitioner, as a public service operator, was exempt from paying additional compensation for work on Sundays and holidays. It also denied the reinstatement demands, finding the separations were for valid grounds, but ordered payment of separation pay and overtime to the three named individuals. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration.
The CIR en banc issued a resolution on June 5, 1955, modifying the trial judge’s decision. It ruled that the four hours of overtime work included in the 12-hour daily schedule (6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.) should be paid independently of the “coffee-money” (extra amounts given for work beyond 6:00 p.m. over some 16 weeks). It also clarified that the 20-minute rest periods after meals should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari, later supplemented, challenging the CIR’s resolution.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the definition of “hours of work” under the Eight-Hour Labor Law ( Commonwealth Act No. 444 ) and the rules on non-working hours are applicable to the seamen employed by the petitioner, given the nature of their work aboard tugboats. Subsidiary issues involve the correctness of the CIR en banc’s resolution modifying the trial judge’s decision.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations. The Court held that the definition of “hours of work” and the rules on non-working hours under the Eight-Hour Labor Law are applicable to the seamen in this case. Under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 , for non-working time not to be counted, the laborer must not be working, must be able to leave his working place, and must be able to rest completely. The Court interpreted “working place” to mean the specific spot where the laborer actually performs his work, not the entire premises of the factory, shop, or boat. Therefore, the seamen’s period of rest, during which they could leave their specific work posts (e.g., engine room, deck) and rest completely elsewhere on the tugboat, should not be counted as working time. The Court found that the CIR’s factual determination—that the employees’ regular work schedule was from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and that the rest periods and meal times were non-working hours—was supported by evidence. Consequently, the employees were entitled to overtime pay for four hours of work beyond the eight-hour legal day.
The Court also upheld the authority of the CIR en banc to modify the trial judge’s decision upon motion for reconsideration, as provided by law. It found no basis to declare the en banc resolution as arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of reason. The petition was dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.