G.R. No. L-9154; February 20, 1914
PASCUALA DENZON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CORAZON CH. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Bartolome Ch. Veloso was convicted of seduction and sentenced to imprisonment and to recognize and maintain the child, Lourdes Denzon. After serving part of his sentence, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor-General. One condition was that he post a bond, approved by the court, to ensure the support and maintenance of the child until her majority. In compliance, defendant-appellant Corazon Ch. Veloso and another executed a joint and several bond in favor of plaintiffs Pascuala Denzon and the child, obligating themselves to ensure that Bartolome would pay the sums fixed by the court for the child’s support. Bartolome initially paid P30 monthly but ceased payments from November 1910, alleging he had become destitute and utterly without means to support himself or the child. The plaintiffs sued on the bond to recover P900 in accrued support. The defense relied on Article 152 of the Civil Code, which provides that the obligation to give support ceases if the obligor’s means are reduced to the point that he cannot pay without neglecting his own and his family’s necessities.

ISSUE:
Does the financial incapacity of the principal obligor (Bartolome Ch. Veloso) to provide support, as described in Article 152 of the Civil Code, release the sureties (Corazon Ch. Veloso) from their liability under the bond executed as a condition for a pardon?

RULING:
No. The judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs is affirmed. The sureties are liable according to the clear terms of their bond. The obligation undertaken by the sureties is not the general civil obligation of support under the Civil Code, but a contractual obligation arising from a bond given to fulfill a specific condition of an executive pardon. The Governor-General, in granting the pardon, had the discretion to impose conditions for the welfare of the child and the public interest. The bond’s language clearly binds the sureties to ensure payment of the court-fixed support, irrespective of the principal’s subsequent financial condition. The rules limiting bonds to statutory requirements, as discussed in Bandoy v. Judge of La Laguna and Herrera v. Neis, are inapplicable because this bond was not given pursuant to a statute but pursuant to an executive conditional pardon. The parties’ intention, gathered from the instrument, was to secure the child’s support unconditionally during her minority. Therefore, the defense based on the principal’s impoverishment under Article 152 of the Civil Code is unavailing against the sureties’ direct contractual promise.