GR L 9137; (August, 1956) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-9137; August 31, 1956
APOLONIA REYES, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO TAN, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners are employees and laborers of the Master Shirt Company and members of the Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa ng Damit labor union. On April 24, 1955, they and other union members declared a strike and established a picket line outside the factory compound in protest against the dismissal of a co-worker. On May 10, 1955, respondents, who were also workers of the same company but members of a rival union (Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Master Shirt Company), filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Manila. They sought a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the petitioners, through acts of coercion and violence, were preventing them (the non-striking employees) from entering the factory to work and from receiving deliveries of food and other necessities, as they had chosen to stay in the factory during the strike. On the same day, based solely on sworn affidavits submitted by the respondents and without a prior hearing, the respondent judge issued the ex parte writ of preliminary injunction. The order stated that the right to picket should not deprive others of their right to eat and to live. The next day, May 11, 1955, the petitioners moved to dissolve the injunction, challenging the court’s jurisdiction on the ground that under Republic Act No. 875 (the Industrial Peace Act), the Court of Industrial Relations had exclusive jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes. The respondent judge denied the motion. The petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
The main issue is whether the respondent Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in this labor dispute, and if it did, whether the procedure for its issuance was valid.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and declared the writ of preliminary injunction null and void.
First, on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court, citing its recent ruling in PAFLU vs. Tan, held that under Republic Act No. 875 , the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to issue injunctions is limited to specific cases: (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court; (2) when the controversy refers to the minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law; (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law; and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice. In all other labor disputes not falling within these categories, the ordinary courts have the power to issue injunctions. In this case, both parties admitted that the acts complained of constituted unfair labor practices. Therefore, jurisdiction over the injunction application pertained to the Court of Industrial Relations, not the Court of First Instance.
Second, assuming arguendo that the respondent court had jurisdiction, the injunction was still void because the mandatory procedure under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 was not followed. The law requires a hearing where the parties are given an opportunity for cross-examination, and the court must find that the testimony under oath is sufficient to justify the injunction. An ex parte injunction can only be issued based on such testimony and is effective for no longer than five days. Here, the respondent judge issued the injunction ex parte based solely on affidavits, without any hearing. This violated the statutory procedure. Consequently, the injunction was invalid from its issuance. Furthermore, even if properly issued, being ex parte, it became void by operation of law after five days. Costs were imposed on the respondent workers.
