G.R. No. L-9034; April 13, 1956
JOSE A. SUELTO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE CECILIA MUÑOZ-PALMA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and RICARDO TEVES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose A. Suelto was the justice of the peace of Pamplona, Negros Oriental. Respondent Ricardo Teves, the municipal mayor of Tanjay, filed an administrative complaint against Suelto for electioneering, abuse of position, and immorality. On January 12, 1955, respondent Judge Cecilia Muñoz-Palma issued an order suspending Suelto from office immediately, pending the administrative investigation. The order stated that Suelto’s continuance in office might obstruct the presentation of evidence from the records of his office and hamper the investigation. Suelto filed motions for reconsideration and later for reinstatement, arguing that the purpose of the suspension had been accomplished and its continuance prevented him from fully defending himself. Both motions were denied by the respondent judge. Suelto then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, claiming the judge gravely abused her authority, that the suspension caused him irreparable injury due to loss of salary and demoralization of his witnesses, and that he was prevented from defending himself. Respondent Teves countered that the suspension was still necessary as Suelto could influence witnesses and that Suelto did not need the salary due to other means of support.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering and continuing the preventive suspension of the petitioner justice of the peace pending the administrative investigation.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. It held that the preventive suspension was within the sound discretion of the respondent judge, who, as the investigating officer with administrative supervision over the petitioner, must have found sufficient reasons for its continuance. The Court noted that the Judiciary Act of 1948 contains no provision limiting the period of preventive suspension for justices of the peace, unlike the 30-day limit for elective municipal officials under the Revised Administrative Code. The absence of such a limitation implies legislative intent to grant full discretion in administrative investigations. The Court found no allegation or circumstance indicating an abuse of discretion, especially since the judge did not dismiss the case after the complainant’s evidence, suggesting a prima facie case existed. The Court also emphasized the delicate nature of the position of justice of the peace, appointed based on reputation for honesty and impartiality, making it improper to reinstate him under the circumstances. Therefore, the petitioner had no clear legal right to reinstatement, and the respondent judge had no corresponding legal duty to return him to his position while the case was pending.