G.R. No. L-9006; March 14, 1914
JOSE ANTONIO GASCON ENRIQUEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. A. D. GIBBS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
On April 15, 1913, the Court of First Instance rendered final judgment in favor of the defendant, A. D. Gibbs. On April 22, 1913, the plaintiff, Jose Antonio Gascon Enriquez, filed a motion for a new trial. This motion was overruled on April 26, 1913, and notice of the order was received by plaintiff’s counsel on the same day. On May 22, 1913, twenty-two days after receiving notice of the denial of his motion for a new trial, the plaintiff excepted to the order, announced his intention to appeal, and submitted his bill of exceptions. The defendant objected to the approval of the bill of exceptions and subsequently moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff failed to perfect his appeal within the time prescribed by Section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( Act No. 190 ).

ISSUE:
Whether the appeal should be dismissed for the plaintiff’s failure to perfect his appeal within the statutory period.

RULING:
Yes, the appeal is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lost his right to appeal by failing to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements.

Under Section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party desiring to appeal must inform the court of that intention “at the time of the rendition of final judgment or as soon thereafter as may be practicable.” The Court has consistently ruled that this notice must be given as soon as practicable after notice of the judgment or order overruling a motion for a new trial. While the phrase “as soon as practicable” is flexible and depends on the circumstances, the Court has generally considered twenty days as a sufficient outer limit for deciding whether to appeal in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for delay.

In this case, the plaintiff filed his notice of intention to appeal twenty-two days after receiving notice that his motion for a new trial was denied. He offered no satisfactory explanation or proof that it was impracticable to file the notice within that period. The mere filing of a motion for a new trial does not automatically serve as a notice of intention to appeal, especially when, as here, the plaintiff later filed a separate formal notice, indicating that the motion itself was not intended to serve that purpose. Even if the motion were treated as an exception and notice, the subsequent 22-day delay in submitting the bill of exceptionsfar beyond the statutory 10-day periodwithout a showing of necessity or a request for an extension, was fatal to the appeal.

Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal was granted, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.