G.R. No. L-8937; November 29, 1957
OLEGARIO BRITO SY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MALATE TAXICAB & GARAGE, INC., defendant-appellant; MALATE TAXICAB & GARAGE, INC., third-party plaintiff-appellant, vs. JESUS DEQUITO Y DUPY, third-party defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On June 26, 1952, plaintiff Olegario Brito Sy engaged a taxicab owned and operated by defendant Malate Taxicab and Garage, Inc. to take him to his place of business. While en route, at the intersection of Dewey Boulevard and Katigbak Drive, the taxicab collided with an army wagon driven by Sgt. Jesus Dequito. Sy suffered injuries, including a fractured right leg, and incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. Sy filed an action against Malate Taxicab based on a contract of carriage to recover various damages. The defendant, in its answer, alleged the collision was due to the negligence of Sgt. Dequito and filed a counterclaim. The lower court initially declared the defendant in default and rendered judgment. After the default order was set aside, the defendant filed a third-party complaint against Sgt. Dequito, alleging his negligence caused the collision. Summons for the third-party complaint could not be served on Dequito due to his military assignments. During the trial on the main case, the defendant failed to appear. The lower court then rendered judgment against the defendant, awarding Sy damages. The defendant appealed, arguing that the third-party complaint presented a prejudicial question and that the lower court erred in not making an express finding on the defendant’s responsibility for the collision.

ISSUE

1. Whether the third-party complaint against Sgt. Dequito constitutes a prejudicial question that should suspend the proceedings in the main action.
2. Whether the lower court erred in not making an express finding as to whether the defendant-appellant was responsible for the collision.

RULING

1. No, the third-party complaint is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before a principal action can be resolved. Here, the main action is based on a contract of carriage, while the third-party complaint is based on an alleged tortious act. The issues in the main case are not entirely dependent on the third-party complaint; rather, the third-party complaint is dependent on the outcome of the main case for the amount of potential reimbursement. The main case is severable and can be litigated independently. The defendant’s potential liability to the plaintiff under the contract of carriage is not affected by the separate question of the third-party defendant’s negligence.
2. No, the lower court did not err. Under Articles 1733, 1755, and particularly 1756 of the New Civil Code, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers. In case of death or injury to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or negligent unless they prove they observed such extraordinary diligence. Since the action is based on a contract of carriage, and not on tort, there is no need for an express finding of fault by the carrier. The law presumes negligence, and it was incumbent upon the defendant-carrier to present evidence to rebut this presumption. The defendant failed to appear at the hearing and presented no evidence to overcome the presumption of negligence. Therefore, the lower court correctly held the defendant liable based on this legal presumption.
The decision of the lower court is affirmed.