G.R. No. L-8564; April 23, 1958
FRANCISCO PELAEZ, deceased, substituted by DOLORES VDA. DE PELAEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUZON LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Plaintiff Francisco Pelaez filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover P36,667.81 from defendant Luzon Lumber Company. The claim consisted of items for overtime pay, sick and vacation leave, medical treatment, actual damages, and attorney’s fees, allegedly due from his employment as laborer, watchman, and driver from December 7, 1946, to May 7, 1952. Pelaez contracted pulmonary tuberculosis and later died. The defendant denied liability, asserting full payment, that no overtime was rendered, that Pelaez voluntarily quit, and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing the claim fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The trial court found it lacked jurisdiction over the claims for leave, medical aid, and damages, and dismissed the overtime claim for insufficient evidence. Plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to hear and decide the plaintiff’s claims for sick and vacation leave, medical aid, and actual damages.
2. Whether the plaintiff’s claim for overtime pay was sufficiently proven.

RULING

1. The Court of First Instance correctly held it had no jurisdiction over the claims for sick/vacation leave, medical aid, and actual damages. Under Section 46 of Act No. 3428 , as amended by Republic Act No. 772 (effective June 20, 1952), the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide compensation claims under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court, citing Castro vs. Sagales, ruled that this jurisdictional change is procedural and applies to claims filed after the law’s approval, regardless of when the cause of action accrued. Furthermore, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides that the rights and remedies it grants exclude all other rights and remedies against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws for the same injury. The Court also noted that the power to grant sick or vacation leave, if it existed, was vested in the Court of Industrial Relations under Commonwealth Act No. 103 , not ordinary courts, and such general jurisdiction was abolished by Republic Act No. 875 absent presidential certification.
2. The trial court’s dismissal of the overtime pay claim was affirmed. The plaintiff’s evidence, consisting of his and his wife’s testimony, was found insufficient and contradictory. The trial judge noted the improbability of the plaintiff working extensive overtime for years without expecting pay, his admission of receiving some overtime pay contrary to his initial claim, and a direct contradiction between his sworn complaint (alleging work from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) and his trial testimony (claiming work from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.) for the same initial period. The Supreme Court found no justification to overturn this factual finding.
The decision of the lower court was affirmed in its entirety.