G.R. No. L-841; April 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMEON MIRANDA Y DANA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The defendant-appellant, Simeon Miranda y Dana, pleaded guilty in the Court of First Instance of Manila to an information charging him with illegal possession of a carbine and ammunition on or about July 27, 1946, in Quezon City within 2 1/2 miles from Manila. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 5 years and 1 day to 6 years imprisonment and to pay costs. Despite his guilty plea, he appealed. His appointed attorney de oficio on appeal concluded the sentence was lawful but raised two issues: first, the record was silent on whether the trial court informed the appellant of his right to counsel at arraignment as required by Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; and second, that the appellant should be given a new trial to potentially avail of the amnesty under Presidential Proclamation No. 1 (which set a deadline for surrendering firearms without penalty) or the exemptions under Republic Act No. 4 .

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court’s failure to have a record showing it informed the appellant of his right to counsel at arraignment constitutes reversible error.
2. Whether the appellant is entitled to a new trial to present evidence that he might be exempt from criminal liability under Republic Act No. 4 or related proclamations.

RULING

The Supreme Court, through Justice Bengzon, affirmed the trial court’s decision.
1. On the right to counsel, the Court held that unless the contrary appears in the record, it is presumed that the trial court performed its duty of informing the defendant of his right to counsel. This presumption is based on the doctrine established in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil. 87), reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). The Court found no reason to modify this doctrine.
2. On the request for a new trial to invoke potential exemptions, the Court ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 1 (extending the surrender deadline) does not legally excuse the possession of firearms under all circumstances until the deadline. The penalty imposed was within the range prescribed by Republic Act No. 4 . Therefore, the decision was affirmed with no costs.
Separate Opinion (Dissent by Justice Perfecto):
Justice Perfecto dissented, arguing that:
1. The duties imposed by Section 3, Rule 112 are mandatory to effectuate the constitutional right to counsel. Whether these duties were performed must affirmatively appear in the record; silence in the record means they were not performed. The presumption applied by the majority improperly allows appellate courts to overlook potential dereliction of duty by trial courts.
2. The cited precedents (Labial, Custan, Abuyen) are unconvincing and reflect a wavering judicial attitude.
3. A new trial should be granted. The appellant, unassisted by counsel at arraignment, may not have known his rights. He could potentially be acquitted under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4 , which exempts from liability persons possessing firearms (without use, except in self-defense) for the purpose of surrendering them within the period fixed by presidential proclamation. Since the appellant was apprehended on July 27, 1946, before the deadline (initially August 31, 1946, later extended to September 30, 1946), he should be allowed to present evidence on this point.
Justice Perfecto voted to reverse the decision and order a new trial.