G.R. No. L-82585, L-82827, L-83979 November 14, 1988
Maximo V. Soliven, et al. and Luis D. Beltran, petitioners, vs. Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar, et al., respondents.

FACTS

These consolidated petitions arose from libel charges filed against newspaper columnists and publishers over articles alleging that President Corazon C. Aquino hid under her bed during a coup attempt. President Aquino initiated the proceedings by filing a complaint-affidavit. The City Fiscal of Manila found probable cause and filed Informations. Petitioners challenged this, arguing the filing was premature as their motion for reconsideration was still pending with the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, the President. They also contended the warrant for Beltran’s arrest was invalid, as the judge did not personally examine the complainant and witnesses. Finally, they argued President Aquino could not file the complaint due to her immunity from suit.

ISSUE

The core issues were: (1) whether filing the Informations during the pendency of administrative review denied due process; (2) whether a judge must personally examine the complainant and witnesses to determine probable cause for an arrest warrant; and (3) whether the President, enjoying immunity from suit, can initiate criminal proceedings by filing a complaint.

RULING

The Court resolved the petitions, upholding the lower court’s proceedings. On the first issue, the Court found it moot and academic. The Secretary of Justice had denied the motions for reconsideration, and the President, through the Executive Secretary, had affirmed this denial. Thus, the administrative review was complete, negating the claim of denied remedies. The Court added that Beltran, by filing a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed” instead of counter-affidavits, effectively waived his right to refute the charges at the preliminary investigation stage. Due process only requires the opportunity to submit counter-evidence, not its actual submission.
On the second issue, the Court clarified the constitutional requirement for arrest warrants. While Article III, Section 2 mandates that probable cause be “determined personally by the judge,” this does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and witnesses. The judge’s personal responsibility is to evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. The judge may issue a warrant based on this evaluation or, if unsatisfied, may require further affidavits. This interpretation balances constitutional safeguards with practical judicial efficiency, preventing judges from being overburdened with conducting preliminary investigations personally.
On the third issue, the Court held that presidential immunity from suit does not disable the President from filing a complaint. The immunity is a protective privilege to ensure the unimpeded performance of official duties, not a weapon to deprive the President of legal recourse to vindicate personal honor. The Court reasoned that allowing the President to initiate proceedings does not automatically compel her to become a witness or subject her to the court’s coercive processes, thus not violating the principle of immunity. The petitions were dismissed.