G.R. No. 81550 . April 15, 1988
CESAR A. CERENO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS D. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch XXXIX (39) at Daet, Camarines Norte, RAMON B. ASIS and JOB DE VELA, Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Municipal Mayor, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Cesar A. Cereno and private respondent Ramon B. Asis were candidates for Municipal Mayor of Vinzons, Camarines Norte in the January 18, 1988 local elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Cereno as the duly elected mayor on January 20, 1988, and he took his oath of office on January 22, 1988. Asis filed an election protest on January 25, 1988, which was raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court presided by respondent Judge Luis D. Dictado. On January 28, 1988, respondent judge issued an order restraining Cereno from taking his oath. Cereno informed the court his oath was already taken, rendering that order moot.
Subsequently, as Cereno prepared to assume office on February 2, 1988, as mandated by law, he was served a supplemental order dated February 2, 1988, from respondent judge, directing him to refrain from assuming office or, if he had already assumed, to cease acting as mayor. The Officer-in-Charge, respondent Job de Vela, continued to hold the office. Cereno filed an urgent motion to set aside the supplemental order, but the judge did not act promptly, prompting this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a restraining order to prevent a duly proclaimed and qualified elected official from assuming office pending an election protest.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the respondent judge’s supplemental order. The legal logic is anchored on the clear mandate of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 6636 , which provides that duly elected local officials shall assume office at noon on February 2, 1988. Petitioner Cereno, having been proclaimed winner and having qualified by taking his oath prior to the filing of the election protest, possessed an actual and existing right to assume the office on that date. The pendency of an election protest does not constitute a legal basis to enjoin the assumption of office by a duly elected and qualified official, as such a protest merely asserts a contingent right in favor of the protestant.
The Court emphasized that an injunction is not a remedy to protect contingent or future rights. The efficiency of public administration requires that the official with the actual right, based on proclamation and qualification, discharge the duties of the office until the protest is adjudicated. The respondent judge’s order impaired this principle and constituted an excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Officer-in-Charge had no lawful right to continue in office. The election protest was to proceed independently but could not justify depriving the proclaimed winner of his office. The decision was immediately executory.