G.R. No. L-81354 July 26, 1988
HUGO RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 18, RUFINO, RUFINA, LIGAYA, FRANCISCO, and ERLINDA, All Surnamed CLEMENTE, OFELIA QUINTO and Husband, LOURDES R. BERNAL and Husband, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Hugo Ramos, was a lessee of a fishpond owned by the Clemente and Quinto families. The lease, originally for ten years, was extended until January 1984. During the lease term, some co-owners executed two agreements with Ramos: a “Kasunduan ng Sanlaan na Mayroong Pagbibile” (Real Estate Mortgage with Sale) over a 7/14 share in 1975, and a “Kasunduan ng Pagpapatibay ng Bilihan Patuluyan” over a 1/4 share in 1979. In 1981, respondent Lourdes Bernal allegedly took physical possession of the entire fishpond. Ramos filed an accion publiciana (Civil Case No. 7201-M) to recover possession. The trial court initially issued a writ of preliminary injunction against Bernal, but the Court of Appeals set it aside. Upon remand, the trial court issued orders restoring Bernal to possession, prompting Ramos’s petition to the Supreme Court.
Ramos argues that the two “Kasunduan” agreements are supervening events that make Bernal’s restoration to possession inequitable. He contends these documents evidence his acquisition of ownership interests, which should defeat Bernal’s claim. Bernal disputes the nature of these agreements, arguing the first was merely a mortgage and that Ramos’s rights, if any, are not yet perfected and cover only a portion of the property.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing orders restoring Lourdes Bernal to possession of the fishpond pending the resolution of the main accion publiciana case.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the trial court’s orders. The legal logic centers on the provisional nature of the restoration and the proper role of injunctive relief. The restoration of Bernal was not a final adjudication of her right to possess but a mere consequence of the Court of Appeals’ dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo ante, not to transfer possession from one party to another prior to final judgment. The exception allowing mandatory injunctions in ejectment cases under Rules 70, Sections 3 and 9 of the Rules of Court does not apply to an accion publiciana, which is an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession.
The Court clarified that Ramos’s “Kasunduan” are evidentiary matters to be presented and weighed during trial, not self-executing instruments that justify immediate dispossession. Their existence does not create a clear legal right warranting injunctive relief, especially as their validity and effect are contested. The distinction between the right of possession (jus possesionis) and ownership is fundamental; alleged ownership documents do not automatically confer a superior right of possession against a party in actual possession under a claim of right. Furthermore, even assuming the documents are valid, they purportedly cover only a fractional share, not the entire fishpond. The trial court’s orders merely complied with the appellate court’s directive to dissolve the injunction, thereby restoring the parties to their positions before its issuance. No grave abuse of discretion attended this ministerial act to maintain the status quo pending a full trial on the merits.