G.R. No. L-810, L-811, L-812, L-813; March 31, 1947
Case Parties/Title:

MANUEL ARTIGAS LOSADA, SANTIAGO AGUDA, and FRANCISCO DANAO, petitioners-appellees, vs. JUAN ACENAS, as Superintendent of Davao Penal Colony at Inagawan, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

The respondent-appellant, Juan Acenas, Superintendent of the Davao Penal Colony at Inagawan, Palawan, appealed from an order dated July 20, 1946, issued by the justice of the peace of Puerto Princesa, Palawan (acting in the absence of the judge of first instance under Act No. 2131 ). The order directed the release on habeas corpus of four inmates: Manuel Artigas Losada, Getulio Geocada, Santiago Aguda, and Francisco Danao. Each petitioner was serving a sentence: Losada for estafa and estafa through falsification (maximum sentence of 15 years, 2 months, and 2 days, due to expire with good conduct allowance on July 16, 1947); Geocada for illegal possession of counterfeit money (due for release April 25, 1947); Aguda for homicide (sentence of 12 years and 1 day, entitled to liberty about January 7, 1948, with good conduct); and Danao for abduction with rape (due to complete sentence with good conduct allowance about June 19, 1948). The lower court granted their release based on their allegation that they had earned a special time allowance under Articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code, as they did not escape during the disorder caused by the war and remained loyal to prison authorities.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners, who did not escape from the penal institution during the disorder caused by the war but remained in confinement, are entitled to the special time allowance of a deduction of one-fifth of their sentences under Articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and denied the petition for habeas corpus. The Court held that the special allowance for loyalty under Articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code applies only to convicts who, having evaded service of their sentences by leaving the penal institution on the occasion of a calamity or catastrophe (such as conflagration, earthquake, explosion, or similar events, or during a mutiny), voluntarily give themselves up to the authorities within 48 hours following a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of the calamity. Since the petitioners did not escape during the war—they remained in the penal colony—they do not fall within the specific class covered by the law. The Court emphasized that the lower court’s equitable considerations, while possibly meritorious for legislative amendment or executive clemency (e.g., parole or pardon), cannot justify judicial expansion of the statute to include conditions not expressly provided. The only favorable circumstance was the respondent’s admission that the petitioners “remained in the penal colony and did not try to escape during the war,” but this does not meet the legal requirements for the special allowance. The petition was denied without costs.
Separate Opinion (Dissent):
Justice Perfecto dissented, advocating for a liberal interpretation of Articles 98 and 158. He argued that the spirit of the law, which rewards loyalty and good behavior during calamities, should encompass petitioners who remained loyal and did not escape during the war—a recognized calamity. He warned that a strict, literal interpretation leads to absurd outcomes, such as penalizing those who voluntarily stay in custody over those who escape and later surrender. He voted to affirm the lower court’s decision, aligning with the modern trend in criminal law to resolve doubts in favor of the accused.