G.R. No. L-7936; November 28, 1913

FACTS:
Juan Liwanag filed a damage suit against the Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company, alleging that he, as an employee, lost his left arm due to the company’s negligence on October 26, 1911. During the pendency of this action, Liwanag filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that the court order the defendant company to provide him a monthly pension of P30 or reinstate him to his former position. The court, interpreting Act No. 1874 , granted the motion and ordered the company to pay Liwanag a monthly pension of P30 in advance during the pendency of the case, with the option to reemploy him at his former wages instead. The Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company then filed an original action for prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to prevent the execution of this order. The company argued that the order was illegal and issued without jurisdiction, contending that Act No. 1874 , as interpreted, deprived it of property without due process by compelling payment without a prior hearing to determine liability. The company also challenged the court’s interpretation that the pension was payable during the entire pendency of the suit.

ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court should grant the writ of prohibition to nullify the trial court’s order for the payment of a monthly pension to Liwanag during the pendency of the damage suit.

RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for prohibition and dismissed the action. The Court held that the action for prohibition was not maintainable for two primary reasons:

1. Failure to Properly Raise Constitutional Question in Lower Court: The record did not show that the company raised the constitutional issue (deprivation of property without due process) before the trial court. No objection was made to the form of the motion, the nature of the hearing, or the lack of an evidentiary trial to determine liability. The first objection was raised only in the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that a claim of denial of due process cannot be raised for the first time on appeal or in an original prohibition action; proper and timely objections must first be made in the court below. Any defect in due process may be cured by the party’s acquiescence.

2. Error in Statutory Interpretation is Not a Jurisdictional Issue: The company’s challenge to the trial court’s interpretation of Act No. 1874 (regarding the duration of the pension) presented, at most, a mere error of law. A misconstruction of a statute does not raise a constitutional question nor affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case. Such an error is correctible through the ordinary course of appeal, not by the extraordinary writ of prohibition.

Therefore, the Supreme Court refused to intervene via prohibition, as the petitioner failed to establish that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The constitutional issue was not properly presented, and the alleged error in interpretation pertained to the exercise of jurisdiction, not a lack of it.