GR L 79284; (November, 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-79284 November 27, 1987
Froilan C. Gandionco, petitioner, vs. Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and Teresita S. Gandionco, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Teresita S. Gandionco, the legal wife of petitioner Froilan C. Gandionco, filed a complaint for legal separation on the ground of concubinage, including a petition for support. This civil case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. Subsequently, she also filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against the petitioner, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15437111. In the civil case, the respondent judge granted private respondent’s application for support pendente lite.
The petitioner moved to suspend the hearings in the civil action for legal separation, including the incident on support pendente lite. He argued that under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the civil action must be suspended pending the outcome of the criminal case, as both actions arise from the same offense of concubinage. He also filed a motion for the respondent judge to inhibit himself, which was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the civil action for legal separation, including the incident of support pendente lite, must be suspended pending the final judgment in the criminal action for concubinage.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action for legal separation is not suspended by the pendency of the criminal case for concubinage. The legal logic is anchored on the distinction between the nature of the two actions under the applicable procedural rules.
The petitioner relied on the old rule (Rule 107 of the former Rules of Court) and the case of Jerusalem v. Zurbano, which stated that a civil action arising from the same offense should be suspended. However, the governing rule at the time was Section 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. This new rule specifically mandates the suspension only of a civil action “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense.” A civil action for legal separation, even if based on the same act of concubinage, is not primarily an action to recover civil liability arising from the crime. Its purpose is to obtain a decree altering the marital status and its legal consequences, such as the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, custody, and support. The claim for support pendente lite is an incident of this separate civil action.
Furthermore, a conviction in the criminal case is not a prerequisite for a decree of legal separation. The civil case requires only a preponderance of evidence to prove the ground, unlike the criminal case which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the two actions can proceed independently. The Court also found no merit in the motion for inhibition, as the judge’s rulings were based on a correct application of the law. The petition was dismissed.
