G.R. No. L-78385 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.

FACTS

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), through the respondent Secretary, issued Department Order No. 37, dated April 10, 1987. This Order authorized private schools to increase their total school fees for the 1987-1988 school year by 10% to 15% without prior DECS approval, with higher increases subject to DECS discretion. The Order was based on a report and recommendations from a DECS-created Task Force on Private Higher Education.
The petitioner, Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., a non-stock, non-profit entity, filed this original Petition for Prohibition. It sought to declare Department Order No. 37 unconstitutional, arguing it was issued without legal basis and in violation of due process. The petitioner contended that the DECS’s power to “regulate” school fees did not include the power to “increase” them and that students and parents, as interested parties, should have been granted a hearing before the fee increase was authorized.

ISSUE

Whether Department Order No. 37, authorizing increases in school fees, was issued without legal authority and in violation of constitutional due process.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On the issue of legal authority, the Court held that the DECS’s power to prescribe school fees is necessarily included in its broad mandate under the Education Act of 1982 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 232). Section 57(3) empowers the DECS to “promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system.” Section 70 further grants it rule-making authority to enforce the Act. As no other government agency was vested with the authority to fix school fees, such power is lodged with the DECS to enable it to discharge its functions effectively.
On the due process challenge, the Court distinguished between legislative and quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of Department Order No. 37 was a legislative function, as it prescribed maximum fee rates applicable to all private schools nationwide. In the exercise of such rule-making or legislative power, prior notice and hearing are not indispensable requirements of due process. The Court found no arbitrariness, noting the DECS acted based on a Task Force report and even reduced the initially recommended increase upon the petitioner’s instance. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands, and the petitioner failed to rebut this presumption or prove grave abuse of discretion warranting the extraordinary writ of prohibition.