G.R. No. L-77760 December 11, 1987
SPOUSES VIOLETTA S. VENTURANZA and ROMY VENTURANZA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE BERNARDO P. PARDO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XLIII, HON. JUDGE ERNESTO MADAMBA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XVII AND NIEVES SENORAN, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Nieves Senoran filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against petitioners-spouses before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC). Summons was issued and served by leaving copies with Augusto Soan, the father of petitioner Violeta Venturanza, at 3412 B.A. Tan Street, Tondo, Manila—the address stated in the complaint. The sheriff’s return indicated service was made through Soan, a person of suitable age and discretion residing at the address. Petitioners failed to answer, prompting the MTC to render a default judgment against them. Petitioners later filed a motion to set aside the judgment, alleging invalid service of summons. They contended that the address was no longer their residence, having moved to Pasay City in April 1985, and that the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over their persons. The MTC denied the motion, finding that preponderant evidence, including telephone directory listings, established the Tondo address as their residence. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the MTC’s decision.

ISSUE

Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners through the substituted service of summons effected upon Augusto Soan at the Tondo address.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and set aside the default judgment. The Court held that substituted service, being an extraordinary method, requires strict compliance with the Rules of Court. For a valid substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14, two conditions must concur: (1) the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, and (2) the service is effected either at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or at the defendant’s office with a competent person in charge. The sheriff’s return in this case was fatally defective. It contained no statement that any prior attempt was made to serve the summons personally upon the petitioners at their residence or that such personal service had failed within a reasonable time. The return merely stated that service was made through Augusto Soan. Without this essential factual foundation demonstrating the impossibility of prompt personal service, the substituted service was invalid. Consequently, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners, rendering all subsequent proceedings, including the default judgment, null and void. The case was remanded to the court of origin for proper service of summons and further proceedings.