GR L 77571; (November, 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-77571 November 27, 1987
CRISTETA BARQUEROS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Cristeta Barqueros was convicted of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution established that she received jewelry valued at P36,500.00 from Victoria T. Ong Oh on trust to sell, with the agreement that she could keep any overprice as commission. After the agreed period, Barqueros neither remitted the proceeds nor returned the jewelry. The trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed a prison sentence and indemnity.
During her appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, Barqueros filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence—an affidavit of desistance executed by the private complainant, Victoria T. Ong Oh. In the affidavit, Ong Oh stated she was convinced the accused was “not totally to blame,” had lost interest in prosecuting the case, and desired its dismissal. The appellate court deferred action on the motion, received the parties’ briefs, and subsequently affirmed the conviction, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the appellate court erred in disregarding the affidavit of desistance and in not granting a new trial based on it.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the conviction. The Court applied the settled doctrine in People vs. Manigbas that affidavits of recantation or desistance executed after conviction are exceedingly unreliable. Such affidavits make a mockery of judicial proceedings, as they would place the search for truth at the mercy of witnesses who change their minds after a solemn trial. A new trial based on retraction is justified only if special circumstances, coupled with the retraction, genuinely cast doubt on the truth of the trial testimony, and if that testimony was so essential that its elimination would have altered the verdict.
The Court found no such special circumstances here. The “circumstances” cited by the petitioner—her own uncorroborated testimonies regarding the sale of the jewelry, a purported check, and an exchange of property—were deemed self-serving and had already been weighed and found insufficient by both lower courts. The affidavit itself did not constitute a categorical exoneration but merely expressed a desire to discontinue the case, stating the accused was “not totally to blame.” Furthermore, the affidavit was executed over seven years after the complaint was filed and more than two years after the trial court’s decision, an unreasonable delay not excused by the complainant’s alleged travels. Thus, the appellate court committed no error in affirming the conviction.