G.R. No. L-76872; July 23, 1987
Wilfredo Torres y Sumulong, petitioner, vs. Hon. Neptali A. Gonzales, The Chairman, Board of Pardons and Parole, and The Director, Bureau of Prisons, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. In 1979, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President, requiring that he “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” He accepted and was released. In 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended the cancellation of his pardon based on evidence that he had been charged with multiple counts of estafa and convicted of sedition (pending appeal). Relying on prior jurisprudence, the President cancelled the pardon, and an Order of Arrest and Recommitment was issued. Torres was rearrested to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
Torres filed this habeas corpus petition, challenging the validity of his recommitment. He argues that a final conviction by a court is necessary to establish a violation of the pardon’s condition, as he has not been finally convicted of the subsequent charges. He further contends that he was deprived of due process, as he was not given a hearing before his arrest and recommitment.

ISSUE

Is a final conviction by a court required before a grantee of a conditional pardon can be validly rearrested and recommitted for an alleged violation of the pardon’s terms?

RULING

No. The Supreme Court, through Justice Feliciano, denied the petition and upheld the recommitment. The Court ruled that a final judicial conviction is not a prerequisite for the cancellation of a conditional pardon and the consequent recommitment of the grantee. The determination of whether a condition has been violated is an executive function, not a judicial one. By accepting the conditional pardon, the grantee consents to the executive’s authority to ascertain a breach based on its own findings.
The Court reaffirmed the doctrine established in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons and Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The executive’s finding of a violation, provided it is not arbitrary or capricious, is conclusive. In this case, the executive branch had sufficient factual basis, including pending criminal charges and a conviction on appeal, to conclude that Torres had violated the condition of his pardon by failing to live a law-abiding life. The due process claim was also rejected, as the essence of due process in this administrative context was satisfied by the investigation conducted by the Board of Pardons and Parole before making its recommendation. The grant of a conditional pardon is an act of executive clemency, and its revocation, when based on a factual determination of breach, rests within the President’s discretionary power.