G.R. No. L-76026 November 9, 1988
PORFIRIO JOPILLO, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, ARSENIO C. DE GUZMAN and RAYMOND LIM, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Raymond Lim filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. The complaint alleged that petitioner Porfirio Jopillo, Jr. was guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation, having no intention to pay from the beginning and was disposing of scrap materials to defraud Lim. The trial court granted the writ ex-parte upon Lim’s filing of a bond. Consequently, a Chevrolet truck owned by Jopillo was attached by the sheriff.
Jopillo filed an urgent motion to discharge the writ under Section 13, Rule 57, arguing its issuance was irregular and improper. At the hearing, he testified the obligation was for simple loans already fully paid by offsetting deliveries of scrap materials, presenting receipts as evidence. The trial court denied the motion, holding the writ was legally issued and instead directed Jopillo to file a counterbond under Section 12, Rule 57 to secure its discharge. His motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to discharge the writ of attachment under Section 13, Rule 57, and in requiring a counterbond instead.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals. The ruling clarified the distinction between the two modes of discharging an attachment under the Rules of Court. Section 12 allows discharge by filing a counterbond, which is a matter of right and does not involve an inquiry into the validity of the attachment’s issuance. In contrast, Section 13 permits discharge on the ground that the attachment was improperly or irregularly issued, which necessitates a preliminary hearing on that specific issue.
The Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Jopillo’s evidence aimed to prove full payment of the obligation, which directly attacked the existence of the cause of action itself. A hearing on a motion to discharge under Section 13 cannot delve into the ultimate merits of the main case, such as the validity of the debt, as this would force a premature trial. The propriety of an attachment based on alleged fraud is determined primarily from the applicant’s affidavit and supporting evidence at the ex-parte stage. Any error in the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence for the Section 13 motion was an error of judgment, correctible by ordinary appeal, not by certiorari. Since the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, certiorari did not lie. The proper recourse for Jopillo was to avail of the counterbond mechanism or to await the final judgment and raise the issue on appeal.