GR L 7574; (May, 1955) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-7574 May 17, 1955
FRANCISCO EPANG, petitioner, vs. MARIA ORTIN DE LEYCO, respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Maria Ortin de Leyco filed a forcible entry and detainer case (C.C. No. 211) against petitioner Francisco Epang in the Justice of the Peace Court of Masinloc, Zambales. She alleged that in August 1949, Epang forcibly entered a portion of her land. Those proceedings were dismissed after Epang verbally agreed to remain as her tenant, paying a yearly rental of 5 cavans. Epang paid the rental for the 1951 crop year but failed to pay for 1952. Upon his refusal to vacate after demand, respondent filed a second detainer complaint. Upon receipt, Epang moved to dismiss on three grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction due to the alleged dispossession occurring more than a year before the complaint; (2) the verbal compromise in the prior case was void for not being in writing or court-approved; and (3) he was the absolute and exclusive owner of the land. Without resolving the motion, the justice of the peace court endorsed the case to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), docketed as Case No. 4407-R. In the CIR, Epang failed to answer within the prescribed period, was declared in default, and an ex-parte trial was held. The CIR found a tenancy relationship and ordered Epang’s ejectment for non-payment of rentals. After notification, Epang moved to set aside the decision, claiming lack of notice of the CIR proceedings and reiterating his claim of ownership based on his deceased father’s homestead application. The CIR en banc denied his motion, with two dissenting judges favoring a relocation survey due to a controversy over the land’s identity. Epang appealed by certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Industrial Relations validly acquired jurisdiction to declare Epang in default and render judgment against him without resolving his pending motion to dismiss and without notice of the trial.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the CIR decision. The proceedings were a denial of due process. Epang’s motion to dismiss in the justice of the peace court interrupted the time to plead, and he was entitled to its resolution before being required to answer. Therefore, his declaration of default was incorrect. Since the case was merely endorsed from the justice of the peace court to the CIR, the proceedings were a continuation, and no new complaint was filed. Epang’s motion, which raised issues on the merits (invalidity of the compromise and claim of ownership), should have been treated as an answer, entitling him to notice of the trial. The failure to give him an opportunity to be heard invalidated the subsequent proceedings. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the CIR with instructions to decide the pending motion to dismiss and then proceed in the regular course.
