G.R. No. L-75069. April 15, 1988.
ERLINDA O. CABRERA, petitioner, vs. VICTORIANA E. VILLANUEVA and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Erlinda O. Cabrera and others were co-owners of a parcel of land in Manila. On March 12, 1968, co-owners Feliciano and Antonio Oropesa sold their combined 28/112 pro indiviso share to private respondent Victoriana E. Villanueva for P12,000. The vendors executed a Joint Affidavit dated April 1, 1968, attesting they had notified the other co-owners in writing, who raised no objection. The sale was registered, and a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 96437) was issued in 1969, reflecting Villanueva as a co-owner. In 1980, over a decade later, Villanueva proposed to Cabrera a partition of the property. Cabrera rejected this and, in a letter dated October 30, 1980, offered to redeem Villanueva’s share. Upon Villanueva’s refusal, Cabrera filed an action for legal redemption.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Cabrera, ordering Villanueva to resell the share for P12,000. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed this decision, holding that Cabrera was duly notified of the sale and had failed to exercise her right of redemption within the legal period. Cabrera appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether petitioner Erlinda O. Cabrera validly exercised her right of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the Civil Code within the 30-day period from written notice of the sale.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision, ruling that Cabrera lost her right of legal redemption. Article 1623 requires the right to be exercised within 30 days from written notice by the vendor. The Court found that written notice was duly served. The vendors’ Joint Affidavit, required for registration, constituted compliance. Furthermore, the issuance of the new TCT in 1969, naming Villanueva as a co-owner and a copy of which was presumably furnished to Cabrera, served as constructive written notice. The Court held that the receipt of the title itself could be considered the written notice contemplated by law.
The legal logic is that the 30-day period for redemption began to run from this constructive notice in 1969. Cabrera’s offer to redeem in October 1980 was made over a decade later, far beyond the reglementary period. Her long inaction, while being aware of Villanueva’s status as a co-owner—evidenced by her receipt of a share of rentals from the property—constituted estoppel. The Court also noted that the 1980 letter from Villanueva’s counsel was itself a written confirmation of the sale, and the 30 days from its receipt had also expired by the time Cabrera made her offer. Therefore, having slept on her rights, Cabrera was barred from exercising legal redemption.