GR L 74816; (March 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-74816 March 17, 1987
ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ET AL., petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners filed an action for abatement of a public nuisance with damages against private respondent Daytona Construction & Development Corporation. After its motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, Daytona filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Instead of filing an answer, Daytona initiated a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court ( G.R. No. 57593 ) by filing a motion for extension of time to file the petition. However, it never actually filed the petition itself. The Supreme Court subsequently informed the parties that no petition was filed within the granted period. Upon petitioners’ motion, the trial court declared Daytona in default and allowed ex-parte presentation of evidence, leading to a judgment ordering the permanent closure of Daytona’s cement batching plant and awarding substantial damages to the petitioners.
Daytona filed several motions to set aside the order of default and for relief from judgment, which were all denied. It also pursued a petition for injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and subsequently with the Supreme Court ( G.R. No. 66097 ), both of which were denied. Daytona then appealed the main decision to the IAC, which reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The IAC also denied petitioners’ motion for an extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of its decision.
ISSUE
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in setting aside the trial court’s order of default and its consequent judgment.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the IAC decision and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, with modification. The legal logic centers on the proper application of default procedures and the consequences of a party’s deliberate strategy to delay proceedings. A motion to dismiss does not serve as a substitute for an answer; upon denial of such a motion, the defendant must file an answer within the period provided by the rules. Daytona’s failure to file an answer after the denial of its motion to dismiss was not due to mere excusable negligence but to a calculated attempt to suspend the proceedings. Its tactic of securing an extension to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court and then not filing it, while keeping this fact from the trial court, constituted a willful and deliberate refusal to participate in the trial. This behavior forfeited any claim to leniency.
The Court emphasized that the rules on default are designed to expedite proceedings and prevent obstinate defendants from trifling with the judicial process. Daytona’s pattern of seeking appellate relief without diligently pursuing it, only to react after an adverse default judgment, demonstrated bad faith and an abuse of court processes. Consequently, the trial court correctly declared it in default. The awards for damages were sustained based on the ex-parte evidence, except for nominal damages, which were eliminated as they are not recoverable when actual or moral damages are awarded. The decision underscores that parties cannot manipulate procedural rules to cause indefinite delay.
