G.R. No. L-74345. January 29, 1988.
FAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ALBERTO G. GOROSPE and RAFAEL GOROSPE, respondents.

FACTS

Alberto Gorospe entrusted a letter for delivery to his son in Quezon City to FAR Corporation, paying a service fee. The letter was never delivered, and no explanation was provided despite demands. Gorospe and his son filed a complaint for damages. The petitioner, through counsel Atty. Melquiades Paredes, engaged in dilatory tactics from the outset, repeatedly challenging the service of summons, which delayed the proceedings for approximately four years before proper service was effected on the corporation’s president.
During the pre-trial, Atty. Paredes presented a secretary’s certificate purporting to grant him authority to represent FAR Corporation. The respondents moved to declare the petitioner in default, arguing the certificate was insufficient as a special power of attorney. Atty. Paredes waived opposition, and the motion was granted. He then filed but failed to argue a motion for reconsideration. The trial court proceeded to receive the respondents’ evidence ex parte and rendered a judgment awarding damages, which was later affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court with a modification reducing the moral damages.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioner in default and in holding it liable based on ex parte evidence.

RULING

The Supreme Court sustained the respondent court’s decision. On the procedural issue, the secretary’s certificate presented by Atty. Paredes was insufficient. Under Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney requires a special authority, not a general one, to represent a client in pre-trial and to perform acts like entering into compromises. The certificate granted authority only for “pre-trial of all the cases” and for “all and every matter that may be necessary,” which is a general authorization and does not constitute the required special power of attorney. Consequently, the default declaration was proper.
Furthermore, the petition was dismissible on the ground of tardiness. The decision of the appellate court was received at counsel’s office on February 5, 1986. The motion for reconsideration was filed only on March 3, 1986, which was beyond the 15-day reglementary period, making the decision final and executory. The excuse of counsel’s absence due to electoral participation was unacceptable. The Court emphasized that such simple cases should not burden the judicial system, criticizing the dilatory tactics employed. Atty. Paredes was censured for his conduct. The petition was denied, and the appellate court’s decision was affirmed in toto.