GR L 74324; (November, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-74324. November 17, 1988.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
FACTS
Accused-appellants Fernando Pugay and Benjamin Samson were charged with Murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate. During a town fiesta in Rosario, Cavite, the intoxicated appellants, along with companions, made fun of Miranda. Pugay poured gasoline from a can onto Miranda’s body. Despite a warning from eyewitness Eduardo Gabion, Samson then set Miranda on fire, turning him into a human torch. The victim was extinguished and rushed to the hospital but later died. Appellants were immediately identified by the crowd and arrested.
At trial, the prosecution presented Gabion’s eyewitness account. The defense repudiated their extrajudicial confessions, claiming they were coerced, and attempted to implicate Gabion. The trial court convicted both of Murder, crediting Pugay with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty and Samson to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of Murder, specifically in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
RULING
The Supreme Court modified the conviction from Murder to Homicide for both appellants. The legal logic centered on the absence of proven qualifying circumstances, particularly treachery. For treachery to qualify a killing as murder, the attack must be deliberate and employ means that ensure execution without risk from any defense the victim might make. The Court found the attack was not deliberately adopted; it arose spontaneously from drunken “fun-making” with the victim, who was already under their control. There was no proof of a preconceived plan to kill in such a manner.
The Court applied Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code on the doctrine of dolo or culpa. Samson’s act of setting the victim ablaze constituted a felony. Even if he only intended to burn the victim’s clothes (which would cause physical injuries), he is criminally liable for the actual result—death. Both appellants were thus guilty of Homicide under Article 249. The Court credited both with the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong, as evidenced by Gabion’s testimony that they appeared stunned upon seeing Miranda burn. Consequently, indeterminate penalties were imposed. The civil indemnity was increased to P30,000.00, solidarily with the actual damages and other awards affirmed by the lower court.
