G.R. No. L-73304 November 9, 1988
Gloria Dela Cruz Vda. De Nabong, petitioner, vs. Hon. Quirino R. Sadang, Regional Trial Court, Br. XXVIII, Third Judicial Region, Cabanatuan City, Sps. Pedro Sunga and Melitona Ignacio, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a series of agrarian disputes between Ignacio Nabong (later substituted by his widow, petitioner Gloria Dela Cruz Vda. De Nabong) and tenant Pedro Sunga over a landholding. The final and executory judgment, rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. SP No. 14440, ordered Sunga to pay rental arrearages and to turn over the landholding to the Samahang Nayon for reassignment under P.D. No. 816. The decision explicitly reserved the right of Sunga’s wife, Melitona Ignacio, to file a separate action to establish her claim of ownership, noting she had signed the answer in the agrarian case claiming such ownership. Upon issuance of a writ of execution, Ignacio filed a third-party claim with the sheriff, alleging sole ownership and that Sunga was merely her helper. The trial court, presiding over the execution, then issued orders requiring the judgment creditor (petitioner) to post an indemnity bond to cover the third-party claim before possession could be delivered to the Samahang Nayon.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to Melitona Ignacio’s third-party claim and in requiring the petitioner to post an indemnity bond, thereby varying the terms of the final and executory judgment.

RULING

Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the challenged orders. The legal logic is twofold. First, Melitona Ignacio is not a true “third party” under Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which contemplates a claimant other than the judgment debtor or his agent. The records established Ignacio as the spouse of the judgment debtor, Pedro Sunga, and she had previously acted as his agent by signing the answer in the agrarian case on their behalf. Her subsequent contradictory claim of being single and Sunga being merely a helper was a belied masquerade that did not confer third-party status. Second, the execution of a final judgment is a ministerial duty. The appellate court’s decision was clear and unconditional in ordering the turn-over of the landholding to the Samahang Nayon, merely reserving Ignacio’s right to file a separate ownership suit. The trial court had no authority to modify this judgment by imposing an additional precondition, such as the posting of an indemnity bond, not found in the dispositive portion. To do so was to vary the judgment, which is invalid. The execution must proceed in strict accordance with the terms of the final judgment without further delay.