G.R. No. L-7318; April 20, 1955
HELEN GENIO DE CHAVEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. A.L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

The petitioners are the widow and child of Felipe Chavez, a mechanic employed by the respondent A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. at its subsidiary station in Tigaon, Albay. On the afternoon of September 10, 1951, Chavez was examining an automobile placed on the grease-rack in the company’s repair shop when a spring broke, pieces hit him, and the car fell off the rack, killing him. The respondent company had an express rule prohibiting the repair of vehicles not belonging to the company in its shop. The company contended that its station manager, Emilio Esperida, had initially ordered the car removed from the shop but that Chavez later brought it back and began repairing it on his own, in violation of the rule. The petitioners claimed that Esperida had fetched Chavez from his home that afternoon, telling him there was work to do at the shop, and that Chavez was repairing the car (belonging to Governor Triviño) upon Esperida’s orders. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur awarded compensation to the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Chavez did not die in the line of duty because the repair was outside the scope of his employment due to the company’s prohibition.

ISSUE

Whether the death of Felipe Chavez arose out of and in the course of his employment, making his heirs entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, despite the company rule against repairing outside vehicles and the alleged violation thereof.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, awarding compensation to the heirs of Felipe Chavez. The Court held that the violation of the company rule (prohibiting repair of outside vehicles) was committed not by the employee Chavez but by his manager, Esperida, who ordered the repair. From Chavez’s perspective, the order from his immediate superior was an order from the company itself, which he was bound to obey as it was work strictly within his scope as a mechanic. The repair was performed within the company’s premises using its facilities, following standard procedure, and there was no showing Chavez acted for his own exclusive profit. The company could not evade its liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by attributing the violation of its internal policy to the employee who was merely following orders. The death therefore arose out of and in the course of employment.