GR L 7290; (November, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-7290 December 29, 1954
NICOLAS BOHAYANG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE IRILO C. MACEREN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, RUFINO TRAVENIO, LEON TRAVENIO, PRUDENCIO TRAVENIO, NARCISO MENDEZ, MAXIMO CONDE, and IGNACIO QUESONA, respondents.
FACTS
The petitioner, Nicolas Bohayang, filed an action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion) and damages in the Court of First Instance of Davao against the respondents (excluding the judge). He claimed prior entry, possession, and cultivation of a parcel of land known as lot No. 105 of Tagum Cadastre since 1935, which continued until the Pacific War. He was compelled to abandon the land during the war but upon his return in October 1946, he found the respondents squatting on and possessing parts of the land and profiting from the hemp hills he had planted. The hearing was set for July 8, 1953. During the hearing, a witness for the plaintiff, the Chief Survey Party of the Bureau of Lands, testified that there was a conflict of claims on lot No. 105 between the petitioner and the respondents, which was pending investigation by the Director of Lands. Based on this, the respondent court issued an order holding the case in abeyance until the Director of Lands determined and submitted a report on the conflict. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, praying for the setting aside of the order and for setting a date for the resumption of the trial, was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent court acted correctly in suspending the hearing of the accion publiciana case and holding it in abeyance pending the determination by the Director of Lands of the conflicting claims over the land.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court granted the writ prayed for. The Court held that while it would not generally interfere with a court’s control of its calendar, the order in question improperly suspended the hearing and made its resumption dependent upon the action of the Director of Lands, which could take a long time. The Court emphasized that an action for recovery of possession is an urgent matter that must be decided promptly to forestall breaches of peace and possible violence. It is the duty of the court to act swiftly and expeditiously in such cases. The respondent court was directed to set aside the order complained of and to set a date for the resumption of the hearing of the case.