G.R. No. L-72644 December 14, 1987
ALFREDO F. PRIMERO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DM TRANSIT, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Alfredo Primero was dismissed from his employment as a bus driver by respondent DM Transit Corporation in August 1974. The dismissal was effected in a harsh manner, with the company dispatcher refusing to assign him a bus for 23 days without explanation. During this period, Primero was subjected to a run-around by management officials, experiencing ridicule, humiliation, and evasive treatment. He was ultimately told to seek employment elsewhere without being informed of any cause for dismissal. Furthermore, DM Transit allegedly persuaded other bus companies not to hire him after his termination. Primero initially filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, seeking back wages and reinstatement. He later withdrew these specific claims to pursue a damage suit in civil court. The Labor Arbiter nonetheless proceeded and, on January 24, 1977, ordered DM Transit to pay Primero separation pay under the Termination Pay Law, a judgment which became final.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner, having recovered separation pay through a final judgment of the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, may subsequently institute a separate action in a regular court to recover moral damages based on the tortious manner of his dismissal.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the dismissal of the civil case by the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Court held that the cause of action for damages arising from the employer’s alleged tortious acts in relation to the dismissal is intrinsically connected to the employer-employee relationship. Consequently, jurisdiction over such claims properly pertained to the Labor Arbiter, not the regular courts. The law at the time of Primero’s dismissal vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction over “all other cases or matters arising from employer-employee relations,” which encompassed claims for moral damages linked to labor disputes. Although a subsequent decree (PD 1367) temporarily removed this jurisdiction from Labor Arbiters, it was restored by PD 1691. More critically, the principle of res judicata bars the second action. The claim for moral damages could and should have been litigated in the initial labor case, as it arose from the same set of facts—the termination of employment and the attendant circumstances. Having elected to pursue his remedy before the labor tribunal and obtained a final judgment for separation pay, Primero is precluded from relitigating matters that were or could have been resolved therein. The civil suit for damages constitutes splitting a single cause of action, which is prohibited.