G.R. No. L-72141. January 12, 1987.
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Allan Sarmiento y Largo and Alberto Moore, accused, Allan Sarmiento y Largo, accused-appellant.

FACTS

On September 20, 1984, accused-appellant Allan Sarmiento, then less than sixteen years old, was arrested at a billiard hall in Tagbilaran City by NARCOM agents. The arrest occurred shortly after Sarmiento passed four sticks of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, a PC informant. Sarmiento had obtained the marijuana from his co-accused, Alberto Moore, to whom he also handed the marked money received from the buyer. Moore initially escaped but was later apprehended. Sarmiento was taken into custody, where he signed a confession without the assistance of counsel or his parents, which he later repudiated during trial.
At trial, the prosecution presented testimonial evidence from the arresting officers and a chemistry report confirming the seized items were marijuana. Sarmiento, who initially pleaded guilty but later changed his plea to not guilty, testified for the defense. He essentially admitted to the transaction, stating he was approached by the informant, procured the marijuana from Moore, and delivered it. His defense focused on challenging the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession and arguing he derived no benefit from the act. Moore was not tried, having been found a drug dependent and committed to a rehabilitation center under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ISSUE

Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act ( Republic Act No. 6425 ), despite his minority and the rejection of his uncounseled confession.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, sentencing Sarmiento to reclusion perpetua. The Court rejected the extrajudicial confession for having been obtained without the assistance of counsel, in line with doctrinal requirements for a valid waiver. However, Sarmiento’s conviction was sustained based on other sufficient evidence establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The legal logic is anchored on the elements of the crime under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The provision penalizes any unauthorized person who sells, administers, delivers, gives away, distributes, or transports any prohibited drug, or acts as a broker in such a transaction. The Court clarified that the law does not require proof of pecuniary benefit or actual physical possession at the time of arrest. Sarmiento’s own testimony and the prosecution’s evidence conclusively showed he acted as a broker or intermediary by receiving money from the poseur-buyer, obtaining the marijuana from Moore, and delivering it. His arguments—that he did not benefit, that no marijuana was found in his possession, that the marked money was not presented, and that the buyer was not called to testify—were unavailing. The act of brokering the transaction itself constitutes the offense. The Court acknowledged the seeming harshness of imposing life imprisonment on a minor, especially compared to Moore who was spared due to his status as a drug dependent, but emphasized the duty to apply the law strictly (dura lex, sed lex) given the grave societal menace of drug trafficking.