G.R. No. L-71855, January 20, 1988
Rizalito Velunta, petitioner, vs. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Colonel Simeon Kempis Jr., President GCM, Recom. VIII, Palo, Leyte, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rizalito Velunta, a regular member of the Integrated National Police (INP) of Tacloban City, was charged with homicide for the shooting death of Romeo Lozano during an altercation while the petitioner was directing traffic on April 16, 1982. An administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed against him with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which, after proceedings, found him guilty of Less Grave Misconduct and imposed a six-month suspension. Concurrently, a criminal complaint for homicide was filed with the City Fiscal’s Office, which found prima facie evidence and, pursuant to P.D. 1850, endorsed the case to the military authorities. Consequently, a General Court Martial was convened to try the criminal case.
The petitioner filed this petition for prohibition to challenge the General Court Martial’s jurisdiction. He argued that Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040, which transferred operational supervision and control over the INP from the Philippine Constabulary to local governments and NAPOLCOM effective July 10, 1985, expressly repealed P.D. 1850. He contended that this transfer removed INP members from the military chain of command and, consequently, divested courts-martial of jurisdiction over crimes committed by police officers.

ISSUE

Whether Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040 repealed P.D. 1850, thereby divesting the General Court Martial of jurisdiction to try the homicide case against the petitioner, a member of the INP.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the General Court Martial retained jurisdiction. The legal logic is anchored on the distinction between administrative operational control and judicial jurisdiction, and the principles governing statutory repeal. The Court clarified that Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040 pertain only to the “operational supervision and direction” of the INP by local governments, which is an administrative function concerning daily police operations and deployment. This is entirely separate from the jurisdictional authority of a court-martial to try criminal cases, which is conferred by P.D. 1850. The executive orders do not mention, much less expressly revoke, the court-martial jurisdiction granted by the decree.
The Court emphasized that repeals by implication are not favored. Section 3 of E.O. 1040, a general repealing clause, does not constitute an express repeal of P.D. 1850. No irreconcilable inconsistency exists between the two laws, as one governs police administration and the other governs the forum for criminal trials. Since jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case had duly attached in the court-martial in 1982 when the case was filed under the then-operative P.D. 1850, that jurisdiction continues until validly transferred by law. The Court further noted that the constitutional mandate for a civilian police force was still in the process of implementation, and the INP remained part of the Philippine Constabulary structure at the time. Therefore, the military tribunal’s jurisdiction was upheld.