G.R. No. L-71782 April 14, 1988
Hadji Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman, et al., petitioners, vs. Dimaporo T. Casar, as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of Poonabayabao, Tamparan and Masiu, Lanao del Sur and The People of the Philippines, respondents.

FACTS

A shooting incident on July 27, 1985, in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, resulted in multiple deaths and injuries. The precise circumstances were unclear, with conflicting reports of either an attack on a residence or an ambush. The Provincial Fiscal, having received a letter-complaint, requested on July 28 that any related cases be forwarded to his office for investigation. Nevertheless, on August 10, 1985, PC Sgt. Jose L. Laruan directly filed a criminal complaint for multiple murder before respondent Judge Dimaporo T. Casar. On that same day, the judge personally examined three witnesses presented by the sergeant, approved the complaint, and issued a warrant of arrest against the fourteen named petitioners and fifty “John Does.”
The petitioners, through counsel, filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, arguing the preliminary investigation was hasty and haphazard, conducted without searching questions and in disregard of the Provincial Fiscal’s prior cognizance. The respondent judge denied the motion. The petitioners thus filed this special civil action seeking to annul the warrant, prohibit further proceedings, and compel the transmittal of the records to the Provincial Fiscal, alleging a denial of due process in the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest after a preliminary investigation allegedly conducted in violation of the prescribed procedure under Rule 112, thereby depriving the petitioners of due process.

RULING

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. The Court upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest against the fourteen named petitioners but voided it as to the fifty “John Does.” The legal logic centered on the two-phase procedure for preliminary investigations under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The first phase is an ex-parte inquiry into the complaint’s sufficiency. The second phase requires notice to the respondent, access to evidence, and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits. The Court found that the proceedings on August 10 constituted only the first, ex-parte, phase. The issuance of the warrant at that stage was permissible, as the rule allows a judge to issue a warrant after a finding of probable cause from the complainant’s evidence, even before proceeding to the second phase where the accused can participate. The certification by the judge that he personally examined the witnesses satisfied the requirement for determining probable cause for the warrant.
However, the warrant against fifty “John Does” was invalid for failing to particularly describe the persons to be seized, contravening the constitutional mandate. The Court also directed the judge to forward the records to the Provincial Fiscal for appropriate action, including the conduct of the second phase of the investigation. This directive was based on practical expediency and to avoid duplication, noting the Fiscal’s earlier request and the review authority he possesses over the judge’s resolution. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the judge’s actions regarding the named petitioners but rectified the procedural overreach concerning the unnamed individuals.