G.R. No. L-71273 July 29, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. APOLONIO HIZON y VELASCO alias Rey Bakla, ARMANDO LIPATA y BARNOBAL alias Teddy and JOHN DOE alias BOY Bungal-At Large, accused, ARMANDO LIPATA y BARNOBAL alias Teddy, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Diosdado Gandillo, a recently returned seaman, was found stabbed to death along EDSA in Quezon City on April 3, 1983. Armando Lipata, along with two others at large, was charged with robbery with homicide. The prosecution’s narrative, based on an extrajudicial confession, alleged that the accused, taking advantage of Gandillo’s intoxication, robbed and killed him. At trial, however, none of the four prosecution witnesses testified to witnessing the crime. Their testimonies merely established the corpus delicti, Gandillo’s possessions prior to his death, and the investigation.
The defense presented an alibi, claiming Lipata was in Samar at the time of the crime. Lipata specifically repudiated his extrajudicial confession, asserting it was prepared beforehand and that he signed it out of fear of being “salvaged.” The trial court convicted Lipata, relying heavily on the detailed nature of the disowned confession, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE

Whether the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant is admissible as evidence against him.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Armando Lipata. The Court held that the extrajudicial confession was inadmissible as it was obtained in violation of constitutional rights during custodial investigation. Applying the doctrines established in Morales v. Enrile and People v. Galit, the Court scrutinized the waiver of the right to counsel within the confession itself.
The legal logic is clear: the Constitution mandates that any person under investigation must be informed of the right to silence and to competent, independent counsel. If the person cannot afford a lawyer, one must be provided. Crucially, these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The Court found that while Lipata was given a perfunctory recital of his rights and answered “Opo” when asked if he understood and if he would give a statement without a lawyer, there was no showing that this waiver was made with the assistance of counsel. The waiver was therefore invalid. Consequently, the detailed confession extracted thereafter was constitutionally infirm and must be excluded from evidence.
Without the confession, the remaining prosecution evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the constitutional presumption of innocence must prevail when the state’s evidence is tainted by a procedural violation, regardless of the weakness of the defense’s alibi. The blunder of the investigator in securing an inadmissible confession cannot be remedied by the court.