GR L 71178; (October, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-71178 October 18, 1985
MILA P. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON. TEODORO G. BONIFACIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII, BELEN T. CARANDANG and GAUDENCIO CARANDANG, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Mila P. Tolentino, along with another, was charged with falsification of a public document in Criminal Case No. TG-1017-84 before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, presided over by respondent Judge Teodoro G. Bonifacio. Before her arraignment, Tolentino filed a motion to suspend the court proceedings. This motion was grounded on the pendency of a Petition for Review she had filed with the Ministry of Justice, seeking a reevaluation of the City Fiscal’s decision to prosecute.
The City Fiscal, required by the court to comment on the motion, explicitly stated he had no objection. He informed the court that he had received a First Indorsement from the Ministry of Justice, dated January 25, 1985, which gave due course to the petition and instructed him to move for the deferment of further court proceedings pending the Ministry’s resolution. The Fiscal also noted that the case records had already been transmitted to the Ministry.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suspend the criminal proceedings despite the City Fiscal’s lack of objection and the pending Petition for Review before the Ministry of Justice.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, annulling the respondent judge’s order. The Court held that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion by refusing to suspend the trial. The legal logic is anchored on the proper allocation of authority between the prosecutorial and judicial branches, and the principle against depriving a superior administrative body of its review powers.
The Court acknowledged that the petitioner had employed dilatory tactics. However, this did not justify the judge’s order to proceed. The prosecuting fiscal, representing the state’s interest, had expressly consented to the suspension in compliance with the directive from the Ministry of Justice, the Fiscal’s superior administrative agency. The judge’s insistence on a speedy trial, stating it was also for the prosecution, was misplaced when the prosecution itself was not seeking expedition. The Court emphasized that a trial judge should not be more anxious than the prosecution to try a case, absent any indication of collusion.
Crucially, allowing the trial to proceed would effectively nullify the Ministry of Justice’s constitutional and statutory power of review over the prosecutorial discretion of its subordinates. A precipitate trial would render the Ministry’s ongoing review moot and meaningless, as a verdict could be reached before the review was completed. Therefore, to preserve the integrity of the Department of Justice’s hierarchical review authority, the trial court must yield and await the resolution of the petition. The Court ordered the suspension of the criminal case and suggested the Ministry expedite its review.