G.R. No. L-70987 January 30, 1987
GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, JR. and ROGELIO SARMIENTO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO PONCE, respondents.

FACTS

The spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino mortgaged four lots to Guillermo Ponce on February 28, 1973. In 1978, the Aquinos sold two of these lots to Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation. Subsequently, Gregorio Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay and levied upon these same two lots. They were sold at public auction to Limpin on October 6, 1980, and the titles were eventually transferred to Rogelio Sarmiento after Limpin sold them to him. Meanwhile, on September 2, 1980, Ponce filed for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage on all four original lots. He obtained a favorable final judgment, and the lots were sold at auction to Ponce on October 12, 1983. The trial court, however, refused to confirm the sale and issue a writ of possession for the two lots now held by Sarmiento, citing the prior cancellation of the original titles. Ponce then filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the special civil action for certiorari and mandamus was the proper remedy for Ponce to challenge the trial court’s refusal to confirm the foreclosure sale and issue a writ of possession for the disputed lots.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the IAC’s decision, ruling that certiorari and mandamus was indeed the proper remedy. The legal logic is that an order denying confirmation of a foreclosure sale based on a third-party claim (like that of Limpin and Sarmiento, who were not parties to the foreclosure suit) is not a mere interlocutory order appealable in the ordinary course. Instead, it is a final order regarding the execution proceedings that effectively determines the rights of a non-party claimant. When a court, in executing a final judgment, commits a grave abuse of discretion or refuses to perform a ministerial duty—such as confirming a proper foreclosure sale and issuing a corresponding writ of possession—the aggrieved party may avail himself of the extraordinary writs. The Court emphasized that courts retain plenary control over the execution of their final judgments until full satisfaction. Here, the trial court’s refusal, based on an external claim, constituted an error correctible by certiorari, as the foreclosure judgment had already become final and executory. The subsequent claims of Limpin and Sarmiento, derived from a separate execution sale against the mortgagor’s vendee, did not nullify Ponce’s superior mortgage lien, which was registered prior to any sale. Therefore, the IAC correctly ordered the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of the writ of possession to Ponce, subject to Sarmiento’s equity of redemption.