G.R. No. L-708; October 24, 1946
Severino Manotok, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Milagros S. Legaspi and Emilio S. Legaspi, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

On September 27, 1946, the plaintiff-appellee, Severino Manotok, filed a petition for the execution of a lower court judgment ordering the defendants-appellants, Milagros S. Legaspi and Emilio S. Legaspi, to vacate the premises. The petition was based on the appellants’ failure to pay or deposit the rent for August 1946 on or before September 10, as required under Section 9 of Rule 72. The appellants opposed the petition, arguing that it was not under oath or supported by an affidavit. They further alleged that an agreement had been entered into between the appellee’s attorney and appellant Emilio S. Legaspi. This agreement stipulated that after the appeal to the Supreme Court was perfected, the rents would be paid directly to the appellee’s attorney or a collector sent to the appellant’s residence, to avoid execution of the judgment while the appeal was pending. In support of this, the appellants presented receipts (Exhibits A, B, B-1, C, and C-1) issued by the appellee’s attorney for belated payments of rents covering various months from January to July 1946. The rent for August 1946 was deposited with the clerk of the Supreme Court on September 30, 1946, after the appellee’s petition for execution had been filed.

ISSUE

Whether the appellee is entitled to the execution of the judgment for ejectment due to the appellants’ failure to pay or deposit the rent for August 1946 on or before the 10th day of September 1946 as required by Rule 72.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for execution. The Court held that while Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 72 grant the landlord the right to ask for execution if the tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent on time, this right can be waived. In this case, the appellee unmistakably waived this right by entering into an agreement with the appellants, allowing them to pay rents out of the time fixed by the Rules and accepting those belated payments for the express purpose of staying the execution of the judgment while the appeal was pending. The appellee is therefore estopped from asking for execution based on the appellants’ failure to pay the August 1946 rent by September 10, since he had agreed to tolerate a reasonable delay in the payment of current rents. The Court noted that the appellee could not unilaterally repudiate this agreement. The resolution of what action to take if a delay becomes unjustifiable and unreasonable was left as an open question (quaere).