G.R. No. L-70; March 22, 1946
Emilio Gomez, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Perfecto Alejo, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Emilio Gomez, filed an action for ejectment (desahucio) against the defendant, Perfecto Alejo. The complaint alleged: (a) Alejo had been occupying three accessory units (accesorias) of Gomez’s property in Manila since 1938, 1941, and 1942 under a verbal lease contract without a definite period, with rentals payable at the end of each month; (b) Alejo, without Gomez’s knowledge or consent, removed the partition between two of the units, causing damages of P100; (c) about six months before filing the complaint (April 17, 1945), Gomez had been requiring Alejo personally and in writing to vacate the units because he needed them for his family to live in, and to pay accrued rentals, but Alejo completely ignored the demand; (d) Gomez thus filed the action seeking judgment for ejectment, damages, and payment of due and accruing rentals until full restitution of the premises. The municipal court of Manila rendered judgment in favor of Gomez. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the defendant interposed several defenses, including that there was another pending case between the same parties, involving the same causes of action and the same accessory units—a case initiated during the Japanese invasion, which had already begun to be heard before the same Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of First Instance dismissed the defenses and affirmed the municipal court’s judgment, leading to this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the present ejectment action is barred by the pendency of a prior action (litis pendentia) between the same parties, involving the same causes of action and the same subject matter (the accessory units).

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and ordered the dismissal of the present case. The defense of litis pendentia was properly raised and substantiated. The Court of First Instance itself recognized in its decision that there had been a prior ejectment case between the same parties concerning the same units, which had not terminated and whose records were destroyed during the battle for Manila. However, it erroneously held that the present case was different because it was based on a cause of action distinct from that in the prior case. The Supreme Court ruled this was a mistake. The factor of time (i.e., a new demand to vacate and a claim for subsequent rentals) does not make the two cases different for purposes of litis pendentia. The first action necessarily covered all subsequent periods until the complete restitution of the leased premises and full payment of accrued rentals—that is, until the definitive termination of the case, either by execution of judgment or voluntary compliance. Unless the first case was terminated by any of the modes provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff could not institute a new ejectment action under the pretext of a new demand. Allowing this would permit multiplicity of suits and could lead to harassment by overwhelming a tenant with several ejectment suits through different and successive demands. The destruction of the records of the prior case during the war did not justify filing a second suit, as the remedy was the reconstitution of the records to either continue or dismiss that case, at the plaintiff’s option. Consequently, the present case must be dismissed. The prior case should be reconstituted and proceeded with until its final termination. To simplify procedures, rental deposits made in the present case are declared valid and shall be transferred to the first case once reconstituted. The records are ordered returned to the court of origin. No pronouncement as to costs.