G.R. No. L-7; January 22, 1946
ANTONIO CO TIAMCO, petitioner, vs. POMPEYO DIAZ, Judge of First Instance of Manila, YAO BOOM SIM (alias Co Hue), YAO KA TIAM (alias Chua Kui), and SY GUI GAM (alias Go Si Pio), respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Antonio Co Tiamco filed an unlawful detainer action in the Municipal Court of Manila against respondents Yao Boom Sim, Yao Ka Tiam, and Sy Gui Gam concerning a building on Sto. Cristo Street, Manila. At trial, petitioner offered Exhibit A, a notice to quit, as evidence. Respondents objected on the ground that the complaint did not allege service of such a notice. The municipal court sustained the objection. Petitioner then filed a mandamus action in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which granted the writ, compelling the municipal court to admit the evidence. The municipal court, after trial, rendered judgment against respondents, who appealed to the Court of First Instance. In the Court of First Instance, the municipal court complaint was reproduced. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint’s failure to allege a prior notice to quit meant the municipal court lacked original jurisdiction, and consequently, the Court of First Instance lacked appellate jurisdiction. The respondent judge sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Petitioner then filed this action for mandamus to compel the reinstatement of his case.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the unlawful detainer case on the ground that the complaint’s failure to allege a prior demand or notice to quit deprived it of appellate jurisdiction.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus. The respondent judge acted correctly in holding that the municipal court lacked original jurisdiction because the complaint reproduced on appeal did not allege the jurisdictional fact of a demand to quit made within one year prior to filing the complaint. Consequently, the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction to try the case on the merits. The Court clarified that a demand is a jurisdictional prerequisite for an unlawful detainer action based on “failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease” under Rule 72, section 2. However, when the action is based on the expiration of a fixed-term lease, no demand is necessary under Articles 1565 and 1581 of the Civil Code, as the lease ceases upon the fixed date. The Court found that the complaint in this case did not specify whether the action was for failure to pay rent/comply with conditions or for expiration of the term. Since the complaint did not allege the jurisdictional demand, the municipal court had no jurisdiction. The fact that evidence of a notice (Exhibit A) was admitted in the municipal court under a mandamus order did not cure the jurisdictional defect in the complaint itself for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. The judgment in the mandamus action compelling the municipal court to admit the evidence did not preclude the Court of First Instance from examining the sufficiency of the complaint on appeal to determine if jurisdictional facts were alleged.