G.R. No. L-6951; October 30, 1953
Pedro Z. Ykalina, petitioner, vs. Ananias Oricio, respondent.

FACTS

In the 1951 elections for the municipality of Valladolid, Occidental Negros, Manuel Z. Ykalina was elected mayor and Antipas Junio was elected vice-mayor. Among the councilors-elect, petitioner Pedro Z. Ykalina obtained the highest number of votes, and respondent Ananias Oricio obtained the fourth highest. On July 18, 1953, Vice-Mayor Antipas Junio resigned, and his resignation was accepted by the Provincial Board on July 24, 1953. On July 25, 1953, an appointment paper, signed by Acting Executive Secretary Marciano Roque “By order of the President,” appointed Ananias Oricio as vice-mayor, vice Antipas Junio. Oricio qualified for the office on July 28, 1953. Subsequently, on August 8, 1953, Mayor Manuel Z. Ykalina was suspended due to administrative charges. The Acting Provincial Governor then informed the suspended mayor to turn over his office to Vice-Mayor Ananias Oricio. Pedro Z. Ykalina, the highest-ranking councilor, then initiated this quo warranto proceeding, asserting his right to assume the mayorship. He argued that under Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, in the absence of a vice-mayor, the councilor with the highest votes should discharge the mayor’s duties. He contended that Oricio’s appointment as vice-mayor was invalid as it was made by the Executive Secretary, not the President, and that an appointive vice-mayor could not succeed under Section 2195.

ISSUE

1. Whether the appointment of Ananias Oricio as vice-mayor, signed by the Acting Executive Secretary “By order of the President,” is valid.
2. Whether an appointive vice-mayor is entitled to assume the duties of the mayor under Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code upon the suspension of the incumbent mayor.

RULING

1. Yes, the appointment is valid. The Court held that the appointment paper, though signed by the Acting Executive Secretary, was done “By order of the President.” This signifies that the President himself had selected the appointee and instructed the Secretary to formalize the appointment. The Presidential order could have been written or oral. Citing principles from the law of public officers, the Court ruled that such an order, as evidenced by the written communication, constitutes a valid appointment. An appointment does not require a formal commission and can be made by oral announcement. The Court found no constitutional or legal objection to this practice, distinguishing it from an appointment made “By authority of the President,” which might imply delegated selection power. The petitioner’s argument that President Quirino could not have made the selection on July 25, 1953, due to undergoing surgery, was rejected, as the directive could have been given earlier, and there was a presumption of regularity in the official act.
2. Yes, an appointive vice-mayor is entitled to assume the mayor’s duties. Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code states that during the mayor’s absence, suspension, or temporary disability, his duties shall be discharged by the vice-mayor, or if there is no vice-mayor, by the highest-ranking councilor. The Court applied the maxim “Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus” (Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish). The provision makes no distinction between elective and appointive vice-mayors. The Court reasoned that since an appointive official can serve as mayor, there is no basis to prevent an appointive vice-mayor from temporarily acting as mayor. Consequently, Ananias Oricio, as the duly appointed and qualified vice-mayor, rightfully assumed the office upon the mayor’s suspension. The petition was dismissed with costs.