GR L 68733; (April, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-68733. April 15, 1988.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUEL MELICOR, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Ruel Melicor, was charged with Murder for the killing of Domingo Makiling on August 24, 1982, in Carmen, Bohol. The information alleged that Melicor, conspiring with others, shot the victim with treachery and evident premeditation. The prosecution’s case rested primarily on the testimony of the victim’s widow, Josefa Makiling. She testified that she and her husband were awakened by someone calling her husband’s name, which she recognized as Melicor’s voice. When her husband opened the door and acknowledged the caller, three successive gunshots were fired, causing his immediate death. Josefa stated she saw the appellant, illuminated by a kerosene lamp and moonlight, holding a long firearm at their doorstep while his companions waited below.
The defense presented an alibi, claiming Melicor was sleeping at his grandfather’s house approximately two kilometers away at the time of the incident. The trial court found the testimony of Josefa Makiling to be credible and positive, while rejecting the alibi as weak and unsubstantiated. The Court of First Instance of Bohol found Melicor guilty of Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, along with orders for indemnity and damages.
ISSUE
The core issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of Murder based on the evidence presented.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. The Court upheld the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the lone eyewitness, Josefa Makiling. Her positive identification of the appellant as the shooter, based on his recognized voice and her subsequent visual confirmation under adequate illumination, was deemed sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterated the legal principle that alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification. For an alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate not merely that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred, but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene. Melicor’s claim of being two kilometers away failed to meet this stringent requirement.
Regarding the qualifying circumstance, the Court agreed that treachery (alevosia) was present. The attack was sudden and unexpected, executed in a manner that denied the victim any opportunity to defend himself. The victim, just awakened and having opened his door in response to a call, was instantly shot without any warning or provocation, ensuring the execution of the crime without risk to the assailant.
However, the Court modified the penalty imposed. Citing its recent ruling in People v. Masangkay and in line with the 1987 Constitution ’s abolition of the death penalty, the prescribed penalty for Murder was reduced to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Supreme Court sentenced Melicor to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The indemnity to the victim’s heirs was also increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). The appealed judgment was thus modified accordingly.
