GR L 6740; (April, 1955) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-6740; April 29, 1955
LUCIO DIMAYUGA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO J. DIMAYUGA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On March 20, 1952, plaintiff Lucio Dimayuga filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas against defendant Antonio J. Dimayuga to recover possession of a parcel of land in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, and to collect various damages. The complaint alleged a contract of lease for a term of ten years from November 12, 1941, which expired on November 12, 1951, without renewal or extension. Defendant filed three motions to dismiss, all based on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action, arguing that the lease had not expired due to a condition therein extending it if sugar cane remained uncut at the term’s end. All motions were denied. The case was set for hearing on August 13, 1952. On August 9, defendant filed a motion to postpone, claiming he needed time to prepare a responsive pleading. The court did not act on the motion beforehand. On the hearing date, neither defendant nor his counsel appeared. The court denied the motion for postponement, received plaintiff’s evidence ex parte, and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint. Defendant appealed.
ISSUE
1. Whether the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for want of cause of action or for being premature.
2. Whether the trial court erred in not granting defendant’s petition for ocular inspection to appreciate the merits of his motion to dismiss.
3. Whether the trial court erred in not granting defendant’s motion for postponement of the hearing.
RULING
1. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss. When a motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency is determined solely by the facts alleged in the complaint. The complaint alleged a ten-year lease expiring on November 12, 1951, without extension. The condition regarding extension for uncut sugar cane, invoked by defendant, was not alleged in the complaint and thus could not be considered in testing its sufficiency. The allegations, if admitted, would allow a valid judgment for plaintiff.
2. The trial court did not err in denying the petition for ocular inspection. Since the motion to dismiss was based on the insufficiency of the complaint, no evidence, including ocular inspection, could be allowed at that stage. The issue must be determined solely from the complaint’s allegations.
3. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for postponement. The grant or denial of a postponement lies within the court’s discretion. A party moving for postponement must be in court on the trial date if the motion has not been favorably acted upon beforehand. Defendant had no right to presume his motion would be granted and his failure to appear justified the denial and the ex parte proceedings.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
