GR L 66497; (July, 1986) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. L-66497-98 July 10, 1986
VIRGILIO V. SACAY, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Virgilio Sacay, a police officer, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of two counts of homicide for the deaths of Antonio Tepace and Paterno Lerma during a riot in Tondo, Manila on April 12, 1979. At trial, Sacay admitted to the shootings but invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and fulfillment of official duty. The prosecution, after the defense’s admission, opted to submit its case primarily on that admission and presented evidence mainly for civil liability. The Sandiganbayan rejected Sacay’s defenses, finding his testimony uncorroborated and inconsistent, and noting the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. It sentenced him to two indeterminate penalties and ordered him to pay damages to the victims’ heirs.
Sacay petitioned for review, arguing the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion. He contended the court ignored material facts supporting his defense, such as the victims being members of a notorious gang and armed with a knife, and that it misapplied the rule on evidence for justifying circumstances. He also alleged bias from the court, citing an incident where a justice questioned a defense witness for testifying “against the prosecution.”
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in convicting the petitioner and in its evaluation of the evidence.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Sacay. The legal logic centers on the standard of proof in criminal cases and the proper evaluation of evidence when an accused admits the act but pleads a justifying circumstance. While an accused admitting a killing assumes the burden of proving the justifying circumstance by credible, clear, and convincing evidence, this does not relieve the prosecution of its ultimate burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the Sandiganbayan focused excessively on the weaknesses of the defense without ensuring the prosecution’s evidence independently established moral certainty of guilt.
Crucially, the prosecution’s case was built almost entirely on Sacay’s judicial admission, without fully presenting its eyewitness. This created a deficient factual record. The Sandiganbayan then dismissed defense evidence, like the recovered knife and gang affiliations, as self-serving without considering they could introduce reasonable doubt. The Court held that every circumstance favorable to the accused must be considered, and the evidence must survive the test of reason. The Sandiganbayan’s approach, including its suggestive questioning of a defense expert witness, demonstrated a predisposition that compromised the cold neutrality required of a judge. Consequently, the proof did not overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, and moral certainty of guilt was not attained.
