G.R. No. L-658; October 25, 1946
Gabriela Vda. de Mendoza, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Gregorio Palacio, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On August 21, 1946, the plaintiff-appellee, Gabriela Vda. de Mendoza, filed a motion for the execution of a Court of First Instance of Manila decision dated January 22, 1946. The motion sought to oust the defendant-appellant, Gregorio Palacio, from the premises because he failed to pay or deposit the rent of P25 for the month of July on or before August 10, 1946. The appellant did not deny this failure but alleged that: (a) he had filed an appeal bond of P60 and had deposited a four-month rent supersedeas bond of P80 with the clerk of the Court of First Instance on October 6, 1945; and (b) Section 9 of the Rules of Court does not require monthly rentals to be paid or deposited within the first ten days of each calendar month.

ISSUE

Whether the defendant-appellant’s failure to pay or deposit the current monthly rent (for July 1946) on time, pending his appeal to the Supreme Court, warrants the execution of the appealed judgment, despite his prior deposit of a supersedeas bond.

RULING

Yes, the execution of the appealed decision is warranted. The Supreme Court granted the appellee’s petition for execution without prejudice to the appeal.
1. Supersedeas Bond Does Not Cover Current Rents: The supersedeas bond deposited by the appellant, amounting to P80, does not relieve him from the obligation to pay or deposit the current rents pending appeal. Citing Mitschiener vs. Barrios (76 Phil., 55), the Court held that the purpose of a supersedeas bond in ejectment cases is to secure the payment of unpaid back rents or the reasonable value of the use of the premises, not to substitute for the payment or deposit of current rents.
2. Interpretation of Section 9, Rule 72: Although Section 9 of Rule 72 (governing appeals to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court) does not explicitly specify when monthly rents must be paid during the appeal, the Court ruled that such payment cannot be left to the appellant’s discretion. By analogy to Section 8 of Rule 72 (governing appeals from justice of the peace or municipal courts to the Court of First Instance), the same procedure must be followed. Section 8 requires the defendant, in the absence of a contract, to pay the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises “on or before the tenth day of each calendar month” for the preceding month.
3. Application by Analogy and Fairness: The Court found a legal analogy between the position of parties during an appeal from a justice of the peace court to the Court of First Instance and an appeal from the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Therefore, a similar procedure for the timely payment of current rents is logical. This interpretation is fair to both parties and is even more favorable to the tenant, as it grants an additional ten days to make the payment compared to the typical obligation to pay by the last day of the month.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Feria (concurring): Concurred in the result, reiterating the ruling in Mitschiener vs. Barrios* that a supersedeas bond does not excuse the appellant from making the periodic payments required by Section 8, Rule 72. He agreed that Section 9 must be interpreted to require the same manner of payments as in Section 8 to prevent execution.
* Justice Hilado (dissenting): Dissented, arguing that the appellant’s deposit of a P80 supersedeas bond (covering four months’ rent) and his subsequent tender of payment for the overdue July rent should preclude execution. He contended that the Court’s ruling was overly technical and defeated substantial justice, citing the case of Caluag Domingo vs. Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Nueva Ecija where execution was set aside under similar circumstances due to a sufficient supersedeas bond. He concluded that the execution should be denied, but agreed that for future guidance, Section 9 should be interpreted by analogy to require deposits in the Supreme Court within the first ten days of each month.