G.R. No. L-6512 and G.R. No. L-6540; June 19, 1953.
Case Parties:

G.R. No. L-6512: JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner, vs. HON. MARCIANO ROQUE, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-6540: THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MAKATI, RIZAL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

In G.R. No. L-6512, Jose D. Villena, the Municipal Mayor of Makati, Rizal, was charged with falsification of a public document, convicted by the Court of First Instance, and sentenced to imprisonment. Administrative charges based on the same falsification, along with other charges (engaging in the practice of law without permission and extortion), were filed with the Office of the President. The charges were referred to the Provincial Governor of Rizal. The Governor suspended Villena but reinstated him after thirty days as per Section 2189 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the Provincial Board had not conducted an investigation. Subsequently, by authority of the President, Acting Executive Secretary Marciano Roque issued a communication directly assuming the investigation of the administrative charges, designating the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal as special investigator, and suspending Villena from office effective immediately until the termination of the proceedings. The communication instructed the Fiscal to give Villena sufficient notice and full opportunity to defend himself. Villena petitioned the Supreme Court to order the Fiscal to desist from the investigation and to declare his suspension null and void.
In G.R. No. L-6540, when Mayor Villena was suspended by the President, Vice-Mayor Bernardo Umali should have automatically assumed the office. However, Umali and Councilor Abundio Suck had been suspended earlier by the Municipal Council under Section 2223 of the Revised Administrative Code for alleged “disorderly conduct,” which consisted of objecting to and protesting against the council minutes that ratified a contract entered into by Mayor Villena involving the falsified document. The Provincial Governor appointed Councilor Ignacio Babasa as acting Mayor. The Office of the President ordered the reinstatement of Umali and Suck, but this order was ignored. Umali and Suck filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which granted a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Municipal Council and others from enforcing the suspension resolutions. The Municipal Council and others petitioned the Supreme Court to review this order.

ISSUE

The primary issue in G.R. No. L-6512 is whether the President of the Philippines has the authority to directly investigate and suspend a municipal mayor for administrative charges, concurrently with or superseding the authority of the provincial governor and provincial board under the Revised Administrative Code.

RULING

The Supreme Court, through Justice Jugo, ruled in favor of the respondents, upholding the President’s authority. The Court held that the power of the provincial governor to investigate and suspend under Sections 2188 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code is not exclusive. The President, through the Secretary of the Interior (who has exclusive supervision over local political subdivisions under Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code), retains the power of control, direction, and supervision. Citing the precedent in Jose D. Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil. 451), the Court stated that the express grant of power to the provincial governor does not preclude the Secretary of the Interior (and by extension, the President) from exercising a similar power. The Court distinguished the case from Lacson vs. Roque (92 Phil. 456) on the grounds that in the present case, Villena was convicted of a crime (falsification of a public document) related to his official duties, and the investigation order specifically ensured due process (notice and opportunity to be heard). The Court further reasoned that since the President has the power to suspend and remove provincial officers under Section 2078, it stands to reason he has the same power over municipal officers. Therefore, the President’s order for investigation and suspension was valid.
In G.R. No. L-6540, the Court ruled that the objection and protest by Umali and Suck did not constitute “disorderly conduct” under Section 2223. Their suspension by the Municipal Council was therefore unjustified. The Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance granting the writ of preliminary injunction, effectively reinstating Umali and Suck.
A dissenting opinion by Justice Pablo argued that Sections 2188-2190 were designed to protect municipal officials from abusive suspensions and that the President’s power under Section 2078 was not intended to abrogate these specific protections. He contended that once the provincial board had taken jurisdiction, it had exclusive authority to proceed, and the President’s intervention was improper.