GR L 64519; (March, 1984) (Digest)
G.R. No. 64519 . March 29, 1984.
MANUELA U. VDA. DE MARAUG, for herself and in her capacity as the guardian ad litem of the minor, MERIAM U. MARAUG, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ALEJANDRO C. SILAPAN, Branch I, Regional Trial Court of 11th Judicial Region, and SADIN MARAUG, Respondents.
FACTS
Sadin Maraug, a Muslim resident of Davao, filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estates of the spouses Sangtan Maraug and Taraboka Maraug with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao, Tagum Branch I. He sought his appointment as administrator. The petition was opposed by Manuela U. Vda. de Maraug, the third wife of the deceased Sangtan Maraug and mother of his only daughter, Meriam. Manuela prayed for her own appointment as administratrix.
Presiding Judge Alejandro C. Silapan, acting motu proprio, dismissed the proceeding. His order of May 16, 1983, held that under Article 143(1)(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the case fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Shari’a District Court. Manuela appealed to the Supreme Court via Republic Act No. 5440 . Notably, the opposing party, Sadin Maraug, agreed with Manuela’s position that the Davao RTC properly had jurisdiction over the proceeding.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court of Davao has jurisdiction over the intestate estate proceeding involving Muslim decedents, or whether such jurisdiction is exclusively vested in a Shari’a District Court.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order, holding that the RTC of Davao correctly possessed jurisdiction. The legal logic is anchored on the non-implementation and territorial limitation of the Shari’a court system under P.D. No. 1083 . The Court clarified that, at the time, no Shari’a District or Circuit Courts had been organized or established anywhere in the country. More critically, the law itself did not mandate their establishment in Davao.
Articles 138 and 150 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws explicitly limit the geographical scope for the creation of Shari’a Courts to ten specified provinces and five cities, all within regions with significant Muslim populations. Davao is not included in this enumerated list. Consequently, Muslims residing in provinces outside these specified areas, such as Davao, are not precluded from availing themselves of the remedies provided by the regular judicial system. The law does not divest ordinary courts of jurisdiction where no Shari’a Courts exist. Therefore, the RTC of Davao erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, and it was directed to proceed with the intestate proceeding.
