G.R. No. L-63575 January 20, 1988
ROSA GICANO and NENITA GEOLLEGUE, petitioners, vs. ROSA GEGATO, RESURRECCION GEGATO and CATALINA GEGATO, respondents.

FACTS

The case involves Lot No. 818, originally co-owned by Maximo Juanico and Matilde Geolingo. Upon their deaths, Matilde’s share was sold to Rosa Gicano in 1951. Maximo’s one-half share passed to his widow, Rosa Gegato, and their three minor children. In 1952, a Deed of Sale (dacion en pago) was executed by Rosa Gegato and the judicial guardian of her minor children, purportedly conveying Maximo’s entire half-share to Rosa Gicano to settle a debt. Consequently, a new title was issued solely in Rosa Gicano’s name. Twenty-three years later, in 1976, Rosa Gegato and her daughters filed an action for reconveyance and damages. They alleged fraud, claiming they intended to convey only a one-third portion of the minors’ interest and were deceived due to their inability to read English.
The Trial Court initially denied a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action but later dismissed the complaint outright on grounds of prescription and laches, without a full trial. It ruled the action, being one for reconveyance based on an implied trust, prescribed in ten years from the registration of the deed and issuance of title in 1952. The Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the case for trial. It theorized the deed might be void ab initio regarding certain shares, rendering the action imprescriptible, and found the dismissal premature.

ISSUE

Whether the action for reconveyance, predicated on fraud and constructive trust, had already prescribed.

RULING

Yes, the action had prescribed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Trial Court’s dismissal. The Court clarified that the respondents’ action was not one to declare a void contract under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, which is imprescriptible. Rather, it was an action for annulment due to fraud, effectively an action for reconveyance based on a constructive trust. Such an action prescribes in ten years from the date of the registration of the deed and the issuance of the new certificate of title. Since the title was issued to Rosa Gicano on September 8, 1952, and the suit was filed only on February 13, 1976, clearly beyond the ten-year period, the action was time-barred.
The Court further held that a trial court may dismiss a case on the ground of prescription based on the pleadings and records when the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period are sufficiently apparent. Here, the dates of registration and filing were uncontested, making the defense of prescription indubitable. No trial on the merits was necessary to establish this legal bar. The Court of Appeals erred in its characterization of the action and in finding the dismissal premature.