G.R. No. L-62810 July 25, 1983
EULALIA MARTIN, petitioner, vs. GEN. FABIAN VER, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and GEN. HAMILTON DIMAYA, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Eulalia Martin filed a habeas corpus petition for her husband, Pvt. Francisco Martin, an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. In April 1981, while still in service, Pvt. Martin allegedly sold two grenades to Rogelio Cruz. One grenade later exploded, killing three persons, including Cruz, and injuring three others. Following an investigation, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined to barracks on May 5, 1981, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. He was discharged from the military service effective May 5, 1982. In December 1982, he was formally charged before a court-martial with violations of the 85th Article of War (wrongful disposal of military property) and the 97th Article of War (conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline) for the alleged sale and unauthorized possession of the grenades.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether a military court retains jurisdiction to try a former soldier for offenses committed while in active service, after his discharge from the armed forces. A secondary issue is whether the delay in filing formal charges constituted a denial of the right to a speedy trial.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. On the jurisdictional issue, the Court ruled that while court-martial jurisdiction generally ceases upon discharge, exceptions exist under the Articles of War. Specifically, Article 95 provides that a person who commits offenses involving fraud against the government, such as the wrongful sale or disposition of military property, remains liable for trial by court-martial even after discharge or dismissal. The Court cited the precedent in De la Cruz vs. Alcaraz, which sustained court-martial jurisdiction over a reservist for misappropriation of funds committed during active service. Since Pvt. Martin was charged with wrongfully disposing of military grenades, his discharge did not divest the military court of jurisdiction, and his preventive detention pending trial was lawful.
Regarding the claim of denial of speedy trial, the Court held no violation occurred. The test for a speedy trial violation begins from the filing of the formal charges, not from the time of arrest. The delay of about one year and seven months from arrest to the filing of charges was justified. The Court applied a balancing test, noting the complexity of the case involving fatalities and injuries, which necessitated thorough investigation and the gathering of witness testimonies. The respondents’ claim that the delay was due to witness unavailability was unchallenged by the petitioner. Therefore, the delay was reasonable and did not infringe on the constitutional right. The petition was dismissed without prejudice to the petitioner applying for bail from the military authorities.