GR L 62465; (May, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-62465. May 24, 1985. SPOUSES ERNESTO S. NIETO and MATILDE NILO NIETO, petitioners, vs. HON. ROMEO D. MAGAT, JUDGE DESIGNATE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH XIII, respondents.
FACTS
The spouses Ernesto and Matilde Nieto, petitioners, filed a petition to adopt their minor nephew, Roy Nieto Sumintac. The childless couple had reared Roy from his birth in 1971 until 1975 and continued to support him. They temporarily resided in Guam for employment, leaving Roy in the Philippines. The Ministry of Social Services and Development (MSSD) submitted a favorable report, recommending the adoption as the petitioners were in a better position to provide for the child compared to his impoverished natural parents.
Despite this favorable recommendation, the Court of First Instance denied the petition. The trial court based its denial on two grounds: first, that the adopting parents were non-residents of the Philippines and were presumably already aliens; and second, that the six-month trial custody period required by Presidential Decree No. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) could not be effected due to their non-residency.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petition for adoption based solely on the petitioners’ temporary non-residency and the perceived impossibility of complying with the trial custody requirement.
RULING
Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and granted the petition for adoption. The legal logic is clear from the provisions of P.D. No. 603. First, the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioners were “already aliens” was an unjustified presumption without factual basis. More importantly, Articles 27 and 28 of P.D. No. 603, which enumerate who may adopt and who may not, do not disqualify a person solely for being a non-resident. The law only disqualifies an alien if disqualified by the laws of his own country or if from a country with which the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations, which were not applicable here.
Second, regarding the trial custody, Article 35 of the same decree explicitly authorizes the court to dispense with this requirement if it finds such dispensation to be for the best interest of the child. The MSSD, in its comment praying for reversal, correctly argued that the trial custody was unnecessary in this case. The child had already been reared by the petitioners for years, was comfortable with them, and the adoption would strengthen family solidarity. Thus, the impossibility of physical trial custody due to non-residency was not a legal bar, as the court had the discretion to waive it for the child’s welfare. The denial based on “technicalities” was therefore erroneous.