G.R. No. L-62117. April 2, 1984.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JESUS ARLEGUI, Judge — Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII, and WILLIAM ESPANOLA, respondents.

FACTS

The private respondent, William Española, was charged with violating Presidential Decree No. 381 in relation to Section 4-B of P.D. No. 189, as amended. The information alleged that during May 1979 and continuously thereafter, in Nasugbu, Batangas, Española willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously established, constructed, managed, and operated development projects for tourism purposes on land under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), known as the Peco de Loro Beach Resort, without the PTA’s prior approval.
Española moved to quash the information, arguing that P.D. No. 381 and the cited section of P.D. No. 189 do not impose criminal liability, making the alleged offense merely administrative. He contended his application with the PTA was given due course and that he even held a foreshore lease application from the Bureau of Lands. The prosecution and the PTA opposed, asserting that P.D. No. 381 explicitly prohibits such projects without prior PTA approval and that violation is penalized under the amended Section 4-B of P.D. No. 189. They argued Española’s claim of PTA action was a matter of defense inappropriate for a motion to quash.

ISSUE

Did the respondent court err in granting the motion to quash and dismissing the criminal case on the grounds that the information was unclear and the cited statutes were permissive rather than prohibitive?

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the respondent court’s order. The Court clarified that the real nature of a crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the information, not by the technical designation of the offense or the specific provision of law cited. An error in citing the applicable law does not vitiate an information if the facts sufficiently allege a crime. Here, the information plainly alleged that Española undertook a tourism development project on PTA-administered land without the required prior approval, which constitutes the core of the offense defined by P.D. No. 381.
The Court further ruled that P.D. No. 381 is unequivocally prohibitive and mandatory, not permissive. Its Section 1 uses the negative mandate “no development project… shall be undertaken… without prior approval,” employs the imperative “shall,” contains a non-exemption clause, and, most decisively, prescribes criminal penalties for its violation. The imposition of penalties for non-compliance definitively characterizes it as a prohibitive statute. Española’s defense that the PTA gave due course to his application involves evidentiary matters that must be presented during a full trial on the merits, not resolved in a motion to quash. The case was remanded for arraignment and trial.