GR L 61425; (March, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-61425. March 28, 1983. LORENZA A. LIWANAG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO CASTILLO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Lorenza Liwanag, the owner of a house verbally leased on a month-to-month basis to private respondent Pedro Castillo, filed an ejectment suit in 1980. She sought to repossess the property under Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa 25, alleging she needed it for her son, Dr. Rafael Liwanag, who was about to be married, to use as his residence and medical clinic. The Municipal Court of Mandaluyong ordered the ejectment, a decision affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It found that the petitioner owned several apartment units and that one unit, previously occupied by her other son, had become vacant and was thus available for Dr. Rafael’s use. The appellate court held this available alternative unit barred ejectment under the law. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, assigning errors primarily concerning the application of Batas Pambansa 25 and the award of attorney’s fees.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the ejectment order based on the existence of another available residential unit owned by the lessor, thereby barring the action under Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa 25.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed its decision, subject to a modification deleting the award of attorney’s fees. The legal logic centers on the strict statutory requirements for ejectment based on the owner’s need. Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa 25 permits such ejectment only when the owner or an immediate family member needs the property as a residential unit and said owner or family member “is not the owner of any other available residential unit.”
The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument for a strict construction of the law in favor of landowners. It emphasized that Batas Pambansa 25 is social welfare legislation designed to balance conflicting interests with a social justice thrust. The provision’s language is clear and mandatory: the need of the owner is insufficient if another suitable residential unit owned by them is available. The factual finding of the Court of Appeals that a vacant apartment unit existed, which could serve the son’s needs, was conclusive and directly precluded the application of the ejectment ground. The law does not authorize ejectment merely because the lessor prefers a specific property; it requires the absence of any other available unit owned by the lessor to meet the stated need.
Regarding attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court deleted the award. It found no evidence of bad faith, as the lower courts had initially sustained the complaint, and the Court of Appeals itself conceded the petitioner acted in good faith. No circumstance under Article 2208 of the Civil Code justified the award.